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For Mom and Dad 
Quotation 
It [Christianity] seems a very male way of thinking of God 
(which is a biased judgment against men): God is one who 
is objective to us, over-against us, and separate from us. It 
comports much better with my feminist sense of reality and 
my feminist ethic to conceive of God as being within us, 
moving between us and indeed ... coming into being with 
us. 
Daphne Hampson, "Is There a Place for 
Feminists in the Catholic Church?" New 
Blaclifriars 68 no.801 (January 1987): p. 
12 
It [religious love] is a state that, once reached, is distinct 
from, prior to, and principle of subsequent judgments of 
value and acts of loving. It is the fulfillment of [a person's] 
capacity for self-transcendence, and as fulfillment, it brings 
deep-set joy and a profound peace. It radiates through the 
whole of one's living and acting, opening one's horizon to 
the full, purifying one' s intentional responses to values, 
rectifying one's scale of preference, underpinning one' s 
judgments of value, simplifying issues by moving them to a 
deeper level, and strengthening one to achieve the good in 
the face of evil .. .. Such being in love is religious. 
Lonergan, Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan: 
Philosophical and Theological Papers, 1958-1964, 
edited by Fred Crowe and Robert Doran. Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1996. p. 20. 
Abstract 
For the last fifty years, feminists have debated whether a feminist Christian theology is 
even achievable. Post-Christian feminists maintain that it is impossible to reverse the 
' sexist society' permeating Christianity, while reformist theologians struggle with how to 
articulate a commitment to feminism in spite of it. The aim of this thesis is to recast the 
debate in an effort to reconcile feminism and faith. Bernard Lonergan's dialectical 
philosophy provides a useful framework for reworking the basic tensions between 
Christian and post-Christian feminists. In particular, the historico-religious triad of 
progress, decline, and redemption reconstructs patriarchy as a symptom of a broader form 
of systemic bias that is reversible through knowledge born of faith. By way of 
philosophical exegesis, the objective is to bolster the particular aims of reformist 
feminism, namely recovery from gender bias, and show that there is a place for feminists 
in the Church. The remote goal is to develop an alternative existential critique of 
patriarchy that is legitimate in both the secular and theological realms and contribute to 
the task of bridging the gap between faith, traditional religion, and feminism. 
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Introduction 
For the last fifty years, feminists have hotly debated whether a feminist Christian 
theology is even possible. Valerie Saiving characterizes the negative position succinctly: 
Christian theology "is not adequate to the universal human situation [because] it does not 
allow women to be both women and full human beings." 1 In this view, a woman cannot 
be both a Christian and a feminist. Yet there are feminist theologians who disagree. These 
theologians struggle with how to articulate a commitment to both feminism and Christian 
faith. In this thesis, I hope to contribute, as a philosopher of religion, to the hopeful aims 
of the latter group. Using Bernard Lonergan's social philosophy, specifically his dialectic 
ofhistory, the aim is to provide an alternative view of that which stands at the center of 
the disagreement, namely the working definition of gender bias. The aim is to recast the 
debate and moved toward reconciliation. What follows is a brief overview of the 
relevance of tackling this particular question, the method directing the overall work, the 
contribution of the thesis to both Lonergan studies and feminist theology, and an outline 
of the structure of the thesis. 
i. i Establishing Relevance 
Academically, the matter is difficult to resolve because it involves a range of 
controversial views. Post-Christian feminists assert that Christianity is irredeemably 
patriarchal - to remain within the church is to legitimate patriarchy, in theory and praxis. 
1 Valerie Saiving, "The Human Situation : A Feminine View," Journal of Religion (1960) as cited in Angela 
Pears, Feminist Christian Encounters: The Methods and Strategies of Feminist Informed Christian 
Theologies (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing, 2004), p. 13 . See also Carol P. Christ and Judith Plaskow, 
eds., Womanspirit Rising: A Feminist Reader in Religion (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1979). 
Women's empowerment and liberation come to fruition only by breaking away from the 
traditional religions to create woman-Church and Thea/logy_2 Christian theologians 
acknowledge that effectively incorporating legitimate feminist criticism of Christian 
patriarchal structures and practices is a difficult task, agreeing, "A feminist must 
experience Christianity as deeply problematic. "3 Yet, reformists are more hopeful about 
the prospects for the reform of the Christian churches along feminist lines, and they 
primarily engage to affect crucial transformation by working from within the structures of 
the church. They believe Christianity is "one religious culture among others that is open 
to feminist restatement."4 
This debate has cast feminist theology into question and the post-Christian and 
reformist feminist attempts to contribute to secular critiques, and to generate theories of 
patriarchy to justify their positions, have been subject to extensive exan1ination. Indeed, 
Saiving engendered the ideological grounds on what was to become a displacement of 
some feminist theologians to the periphery of feminist scholarship. The value of these 
contributions, however, is not my immediate concern. Rather, I consider the existential 
consequences of the displacement of feminist scholarship to the periphery of prime 
importance. Freedom is important. If one excludes faith in feminism, then one excludes 
the whole woman of faith from feminism and in fact may alienate her from the self she 
would like to be. Christian women believe in God, perhaps a specific God, and this belief 
2 Rosemary Radford Ruether & Daphne Hampson, " Is There a Place for Feminists in the Catholic Church?" 
New Blaclifriars 68 no.80 I (January 1987): 7-24, p. 8. For an expanded version of the debate also see, 
Daphne Hampson, ed., Swallowing a Fishbone? Feminist Theologians Debate Christianity (London : SPCK 
Press, 1996). 
3 Ibid. , p. 8. 
4 Ibid. , p. 15. 
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is manifest in Christian doctrine and the practice of charity and mercy. Their beliefs and 
their faith are integral to their experience, their intellectual horizon, and their praxis. They 
consider faith as an intricate, yet very real , component of their understanding of 
themselves as feminists, Christians, human beings, and women. For some, eliminating 
Christian faith would alienate them from "le sentiment de I' existence" - the direct moral 
contact with oneself. 5 I believe that the many existential implications and tensions 
inherent in this debate imply restrictions on freedom. Thus, a reworking of what defines 
faith-based values, an effort that may allow women to fulfill self-realization and achieve 
authenticity, is to be integral to our discussion. 
Being true to myself means being true to my own 
originality, which is something only I can articulate and 
discover. In articulating it, I am also defining myself. I am 
realizing a potentiality that is properly my own. This is the 
background understanding to the modern ideal of 
authenticity in which the ideal is usually couched.6 
i. ii The Task at Hand 
To rework a debate born in the 1960s, reexamined in 1980 's and ongoing in 2009 
is difficult. The tension among personal authenticity, Christian faith, feminism, and the 
Church has become increasing difficult in the contemporary climate of post -modern, 
post-Christian analyses. Questions arise: some consider spirituality disconcerting. Is 
undertaking a theological argument a self-indulgent exercise? Is faith a self-indulgent act 
or, worse, a meaningless search for meaning? Yet, regardless of what is a worthy 
contribution in a theoretical sense, Christian faith and spirituality remain very real to 
5 See David Gauthier, Rousseau: The Sentiment of Existence (London: Cambridge University Press), 2006. 
6 Charles Taylor, Multiculturalism and the Politics of Recognition (Princeton University Press, 1992), p. 
31 . 
3 
some feminists. As Janet Soskice states, "Feminism has caused me to anguish over 
actions and attitudes of the churches, has made me suspicious of various representations 
of Christian teaching, but [the choice] to give up on Christian faith ... would not be a 
matter of reasons alone/ The question, ' why are you still a Christian?' may echo the 
question, 'why are you still in love?' Many women anxiously turn inward, reviewing the 
nature and extent to which not only faith but also feminism itself is fulfilling and 
purposeful. In this light, I believe Christian women cannot, or at least should not have to, 
bracket faith away while they are feminists any more than they can stop being feminists 
when they are in church. Other questions therefore arise: does feminism fully include 
women of faith? Is the abandonment oftraditional religion by post-Christian feminists 
effectively excluding women of faith from the feminist community? 
This is not to ' trouble ' feminism. Indeed, Christianity is patriarchal. Christianity 
is problematic. Christianity is sexist. Yet, I do not believe it is irredeemably so. This is 
the case not because the existential consequences are profoundly alienating but because a 
particular social philosophy al lows us to recast this debate with the aim of 
reconceptualizing the major notions that act as barriers in the debate. Along the same 
lines of Hampson's and Daly's efforts to gentrify "religion" to carve out a safe space for 
feminism in the 1960's and 1970's, I aim to gentrify feminist critiques of patriarchy and 
the notions grounding the debate to carve out a safe space for faith in the 21 51 century. 
This effort involves re-conceptualizing gender bias, patriarchy and faith, and articulating 
a normative notion of authentic self-acceptance grounded in religion that is in line with 
7 Janet Martin Soskice, "Turning the Symbols," in Swallowing a Fishbone ? Feminist Theologians Debate 
Christianity, ed. Daphne Hampson (London: SPCK Press, 1996), p. 17. 
4 
feminist principles. Reconciling Christianity and feminism by showing that faith is 
integral to being both an authentic human being and an authentic feminist is my intention. 
Further, though this present work is neither confessional nor theological, I fee l the 
fundamental experience of existential tension that emerges in this discourse is a valid and 
hopeful start for restructuring the debate within feminism about Christianity. Living 
authentically in the tension between feminist criticism and Christian faith may in fact 
lead to a greater freedom and, perhaps, a fuller humanity, where women may fu lly realize 
their relationship with their potential selves. 
While there certainly have been efforts to reconcile Christianity and feminism, 
and we will explore examples below, the debate within feminist circles focuses on the 
incompatibility between Christianity and feminism, and the lack of common ground 
among feminists themselves. This approach has not resolved the issue. We need tore-
examine its merits. I propose to explore the tension between feminism and Christianity to 
discover if there is any common ground between Christian and post- Christian feminists, 
intellectually and existentially. My basic premise is that we need to take seriously the 
claims and concerns of both Christian feminists and post-Christian feminists. We need to 
promote the idea of authenticity with neither uncritical acceptance, nor wholesale 
condemnation of the idea. Remotely, what we are in search of is a solid foundation for 
those feminists who choose to live according to Christian values. To discover such a 
foundation is eradicate the notion that it is an inherent contradiction to be a Christian 
feminist. This would not remove the real , lived, existential tension of Christian feminists. 
Contradictions do exist, though I argue they are not due to an actual inherent sex ism. The 
5 
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tension, rather, is historically and concretely manifest in individuals and in communities 
and it will only work itself out over time. Given the complexity of the issue, for the 
present, I consider only one promising approach that might hasten our collective journey 
8 
towards the remote goal. 
My approach assumes that the post-Christian feminist claim that it is impossible 
to be both a feminist and a Christian is false. I argue that this position is restrictive and 
renders the Christian feminist without freedom of faith or choice. The problem of the 
tension between criticism and faith is resolved by eliminating one pole ofthe tension. 
Thus, it fails to acknowledge an essential dimension of the real lived experience of 
Christian women. This critical issue has become, in my view, a question of a basic human 
freedom. There is a deep irony here, for central to contemporary feminism is the project 
of recovery, freedom, and acknowledging the real experiences of woman repressed in all 
patriarchal systems. I contend that feminism must develop a solid structure for faith-
based values and create an inclusive space for the religious dynamics of human living 
within the framework of a feminist critique of patriarchy. This is my aim. 
i. iii Methodology 
The review of the pertinent feminist literature illustrates the difficulty of finding 
an effective foundation for bridging faith-based values and secular feminist critiques of 
patriarchy. Somewhat at the margins of the debate, a small group of feminists influenced 
s See Lonergan's law of genuineness in Insight: Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 3, ed. Robert 
E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran, chapter XV (Toronto: University ofToronto Press, 1992), 
pp. 499-503. 
6 
by the work of the Canadian philosopher and theologian Bernard Lonergan has addressed 
this issue.9 Lonergan's work has been influential in Catholic philosophical and 
theological circles and has slowly made significant inroads in a number of fields 
including the philosophy of science, economics, literary criticism, aesthetics, biblical 
criticism, historiography, and psychology. Some feminist scholars have used Lonergan' s 
philosophy as a resource since 1975, when Denise Lardner Carmody published "Feminist 
Redemption: Doris Lessing and Bernard Lonergan." 10 In 1982, in Feminism & 
Christianity: A Two-way Reflection, Carmody explored the convergence of Christianity 
and feminism, arguing that theism adds a positive dimension to feminism. The following 
year, Patricia Wilson-Kastner used Lonergan to ground chapter two of her Faith, 
Feminism & the Christ. She asks the question: Can one be both Christian and feminist? 
Kastner, assuming Lonergan's theory is crucial for the development of a feminist 
epistemology, appropriates his cognitional theory to analyze the epistemological 
assumptions of Kant and Descartes, both frequent targets of secular feminists . 
The publication of Lonergan and Feminism in 1994 was a significant event within 
the Lonergan community. Carmody' s "Lonergan's Transcendental Precepts and the 
Foundations of Christian Feminist Ethics," explored how conceptualizing the precepts: 
Be attentive, be intelligent, be reasonable, be responsible, and be in love, as foundations 
9 See Cynthia Crysdale, ed. , Lonergan and Feminism (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994). 
(hereafter Lonergan and Feminism) 
10 The earliest use of Lonergan as a feminist resource is in Joseph Flanagan, "The Basic Patterns of Human 
Understanding According to Bernard Lonergan" (January I, 1967). ETD Collection for Fordham 
University. Paper AAI6711490. http://fordham .bepress.com/dissertations/ AAI6711490 
7 
for a Christian feminist ethic. 11 Similarly, in "Authentic Feminist Doctrine," Tad Dunne 
explored Lonergan's notion of 'consciousness-raising' to sort through the many 
conflicting feminist 'doctrines'. 12 His aim was to find which are authentic, and from there 
to work toward a normative notion of women's well-being. Because Lonergan defined 
authenticity as obedience to exigencies for raising questions, the transcendental precepts 
play a central role in Dunne's work. 13 Charles C. Hefling's article "On the Possible 
Relevance of Lonergan's Thought to Some Feminist Questions in Christology" is 
sympathetic to the academic and existential tensions between Christian faith and 
feminism. 14 Cognizant that the theological explanation of Jesus' person and work are 
problematic in feminist theology, Hefling asks whether Lonergan's Christology is 
compatible with feminism. In this light, Hefling makes use of Lonergan's notions of 
religious conversion and redemption to resolve the issue. 
Paulette Kidder's "Woman of Reason: Lonergan and Feminist Epistemology," 
Elizabeth A Morelli's "Women's Intuition: A Lonerganian Analysis," and Cynthia S.W. 
Crysdale's "Women and Social Construction of Self-Appropriation" are central to the 
11 Denise Lardner Carmody, "Lonergan's Transcendental Precepts and the Foundations of Christian 
Feminist Ethics," in Lonergan and Feminism, ed. Cynthia Crysdale (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
1994), pp. 134-145. 
12 Tad Dunne, "Authentic Feminist Doctrine," in Lonergan and Feminism, ed. Cynthia Crysdale (Toronto: 
University ofToronto Press, 1994). pp. 114-133. 
13 In "Emergent Probability and the Ecofeminist Critique of Hierarchy," in in Lonergan and Feminism, ed. 
Cynthia Crysdale (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994), pp. 146-174, Michael Shute focuses on 
Lonergan's notions of human consciousness, emergent probability, and his understanding of'nature' in its 
hierarchical structure in order to better understand the eco-feminist critique of 'the great chain of being'. 
Mary Frohlich, on the other hand, deals with the use of gender analogies within theological discourse, in 
"From Mystification to Mystery: Lonergan and the Theological Significance of Sexuality," in Lonergan 
and Feminism, ed. Cynthia Crysdale (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994), pp. 175-198. Part two of 
her article employs anthropological and methodical principles to refine feminist distinctions of'sex' and 
'gender.' 
14 Charles C. He fling, Jr., "On the Possible Relevance of Lonergan's Thought to Some feminist Questions 
in Christology," in in Lonergan and Feminism, ed. Cynthia Crysdale (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 1994), pp. 114-133. 
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goal ofthis thesis. Morelli examines the traditional Western notion that assigns different 
types of rationality to men and women and asks whether the cognitional operations are 
'gender-specific'. 15 Using Lonergan's cognitional analysis as a guide, Crysdale explores 
the social conditions necessary for the emergence of 'gendered' consciousness. 16 Kidder 
draws parallels between the epistemologies of feminists Lorraine Code, Sandra Harding, 
and Lonergan's epistemology. Kidder suggests, "Feminist analysis of patriarchy provides 
a concrete account of the workings of bias." 17 
What makes Lonergan's work particularly adaptable and especially promising is 
its foundational character. Like the work of such philosophical predecessors such as 
Aristotle, Aquinas, Hegel and Marx, Lonergan's method and ideas are systematic and are 
applicable to any field of inquiry. Lonergan's work influenced feminists to focus on his 
cognitional theory. A central claim of these writers has been that Lonergan's insistence 
on the general nature of the account of human intelligence, irrespective of gender or 
culture, is compatible with feminist goals. 18 If true, this establishes common ground 
between men and woman at the most foundational level. 
15 See Elizabeth A. Morelli, "Women's Intuition: A Lonerganian Analysis," in Lonergan and Feminism, ed. 
Cynthia Crysdale (Toronto: University ofToronto Press, 1994), pp. 72-87. 
16 Cynthia S. W. Crysdale, "Women and the Social Construction of Self-Appropriation," in Lonergan and 
Feminism, ed. Cynthia Crysdale (Toronto: University ofToronto Press, 1994), pp. 88-113 . 
17 See Paulette Kidder, "Woman of Reason: Lonergan and Feminist Epistemology," in Lonergan and 
Feminism, ed. Cynthia Crysdale (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994), pp. 33-48; Evelyn Fox 
Keller, Reflections on Gender and Science (New Haven, CT & London: Yale University Press, 1985); 
Bernard Lonergan, "Healing and Creating in History" in Macro-Economic Dynamics: An Essay in 
Circulation Analysis. Ed. Frederick G. Lawrence, Patrick H. Byrne, and Charles C. Hetling, Jr. Collected 
Works of Bernard Lonergan Vol 15. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988.); and Michael Shute, The 
Origins of Lonergan 's Notion ofthe Dialectic ofHistoty: A Study of Lonergan 's Early Writings on Hist01y 
(London: University Press of America, 1993). 
18 See Crysdale, " Women and the Social Construction of Self-Appropriation," in Lonergan and Feminism, 
ed. Cynthia Crysdale (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994), pp. 88-113; Michael Vertin, "Gender, 
Science, and Cognitional Conversion," in Lonergan and Feminism, ed. Cynthia Crysdale (Toronto: 
9 
Clearly, Lonergan's cognitional theory has contributed to feminist analysis, and 
Lonergan's general method has proven helpful in efforts to bridge the gender gap. It may 
therefore also prove helpful in our search for some common ground between Christian 
and post-Christian feminists. This attempt involves moving beyond the scope of 
Lonergan' s cognitional theory, however. Though the cognitional theory is the foundation 
of his philosophy, and the foundation for this thesis, it can only get us so far in terms of 
understanding the current debate of the role of faith in the critique of patriarchy. It may 
highlight the normativity of faith and the inherent religious operations within the human 
subject and this may ground an argument for the use of faith more generally. However, it 
is the notion that Christianity is systemically and irretrievably biased that stands at the 
center of the debate between Christian and post-Christian feminists. To actually re-
conceptual ize and reconstitute what faith and patriarchy are, it is necessary to push 
beyond the cognitional theory and deliberation to examine the notion of the human good 
and his unique understanding of 'bias' . Because the notion of 'bias' is central to his 
philosophy of history, and because his philosophy of history is the entry point for his 
discussion of religion in his main philosophical work Insight, I will use Lonergan ' s 
notion of the dialectic of history as the central theme for working through the basic issues 
ofthis thesis. Lonergan's dialectic of history will provide a basis for re-examining a 
feminist experience' and 'praxis' offaith in the context of social theory and the feminist 
critique of patriarchy. The hope is that we can develop a critique of patriarchy that is 
legitimate in both the secular and theological realms. 
University of Toronto Press, 1994), pp. 49-71 ; and Kidder, " Women of Reason," in Lonergan and 
Feminism, ed. Cynthia Crysdale (Toronto: University ofToronto Press, 1994), pp. 33-48. 
10 
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My basic strategy is to turn the concept of patriarchy on its head, work from a 
sociological and philosophical understanding of the dialectic of history, and thereby 
analyze 'patriarchy' and 'sexism' as symptoms of bias, not as the root cause. In this 
context, 'faith' will emerge as a healing vector compatible with all factions of feminist 
theory, rather than as a tool to help perpetuate the cycle of oppression. 
i. iv Contribution 
Applying the full framework of Lonergan's notion of the dialectic of history in a 
feminist context is new to both feminism and Lonergan studies. Doing so is potentially 
fruitful for three central reasons. First, Lonergan's work proves a valuable feminist 
resource not only in terms of contributing to feminist scholarship, but also in terms of a 
method for appropriating women's experience and creativity. Second, Lonergan 
conceives his social theory as normatively human. Thus, his theory holds out hope for 
developing a method for the analysis of women's oppression without ontologically 
isolating women's experience. Third, as mentioned, Lonergan's philosophy is 
comprehensive and in principle applicable to all fields of human inquiry. Yet, unlike 
philosophical foundations such as Kant, Marx, Hegel and liberalism, which have 
informed Christian, secular and post-Christian feminist theory, religious reality is an 
integral component of Lonergan' s philosophical foundations and radically informs his 
social philosophy. Lonergan does not refute, negate, lessen, or even restructure the 
fundamentals of the ' feminist critical principle' or critique of patriarchy. Rather, he 
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reinforces them while adding a metaphysical context otherwise ambiguous, missing, or 
consciously neglected in the undercurrent ideologies of feminist theory. 
My aim is not to develop a feminist theology; this is a task properly belonging to 
feminist theologians. Rather, the intention is to explore the strictly philosophical 
foundations of religion and history as they pertain to the question of the thesis. A crucial 
element in this effort is Lonergan's understanding of ' bias,' which challenges the 
received feminist version of gender bias, not its account of the historical details and 
damage done, but in the metaphysical meaning of the term. 
i. v Structure of Thesis 
Accordingly, there are four tasks ahead. The fi rst chapter examines the debate 
between secular feminists and feminist theologians and explores the methodological 
difficulties insured in bridging faith and critiques of patriarchy. The second chapter lays 
out the notions that inform Lonergan's social philosophy, most specifically his 
cognitional theory, which involves the notions of deliberation and intellectual, moral, and 
religious conversion. Chapter three examines the first two approximations of the dialectic 
of history: progress, and decline. Finally, chapter four centers primarily on the role and 
function of faith according to the last approximation of Lonergan's philosophy. Through 
a reworking of how gender bias emerged within the Church, an alternative critique of 
patriarchy emerges from the structure that is the full dialectic of history. Within this 
framework of analysis, the epilogue applies these categories to the problem as laid out by 
12 
,--------------------------------------------------------------------------------·· -------
Rosemary Radford Ruether and Daphne Hampson. 19 What this task provides is a better 
defense of Ruether's position than Ruether has herself. I will show that the application of 
Lonergan ' s dialectic ofhistory bolsters Ruether's philosophical position. That is my aim. 
19 Rosemary Radford Ruether & Daphne Hampson, " Is There a Place for Feminists in the Catholic 
Church," New Blackfriars 68 no.80 l (January 1987): 7-24. 
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Chapter 1: Overview of the Debate 
The task of this chapter is to set down a methodological context for exploring the 
debate between Christian and post-Christian feminists on the compatibility of feminism 
and Christianity. The debate is of considerable existential import for feminist scholars 
and for this reason, the Ruether-Hampson dialogue is an apt entrance point for exploring 
the debate. The chapter therefore begins with an account of the key points of that debate. 
The second section situates the debate in the broader contemporary context of Christian 
and post-Christian feminists . The third section briefly describes my intentions and further 
articulates the methodology for an alternative critique of patriarchy and role for faith in 
feminist discourse. 
1.1 Ruether Versus Hampson 
I am a Western person, living in a post-Christian age, who 
has taken something with me from Christian thinkers, but 
who has rejected the Christian myth. Indeed I want to go a 
lot further than that. The myth is not neutral; it is highly 
dangerous. It is a brilliant, subtle, elaborate, male cultural 
projection, calculated to legitimize a patriarchal world and 
to enable men to find their way within it. We need to see it 
for what it is. But for myself I am a spiritual person, not an 
atheist ... I am quite clear there is an underlying 
goodness, beauty and order; that it is powerful, such that 
we can draw on it, while we are inter-related with it. I call 
that God. ' 1 
1 Hampson, a plenary talk at the 1997 Sea of Faith Network conference, "An Ethic for the 2 1" Century" 
Exploring and Promoting Religious Faith as Human Creation. http://www.sofn.org.uk/conferences/ 
hamps97 .htm I 
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Daphne Hampson, a controversial Harvard and Oxford educated theologian, 
argues for the fundamental incompatibility of Christianity and feminism. In reply, the 
well-respected feminist Rosemary Ruether argues that, while Christianity has a sexist 
history, it is not impossible to be both an authentic feminist and a Christian. A discussion 
between the two women appeared in Black friars in January 1987 under the title, "Is 
There a Place for Feminists in a Christian Church?"2 The following section highlights 
aspects of the debate most relevant to, and within the scope of, the aim of the thesis. 
1.1.1 Hampson 
Hampson's position on the role of fai th and the function of feminism within the 
Church is far from ambiguous. She writes: 
Obviously, the Christian Church is better off with feminists 
than without feminists. Therefore, if one is a feminist and a 
Christian one should stay in the Christian Church and work 
for change. But, to put it mildly, Christianity cannot allow 
for the equality of women. I am contending that it is 
intrinsic to the nature of the Christian religion that it is 
sexist: that Christianity cannot continue to be itself and 
allow for the equality ofwomen.3 
For Hampson, Christianity is a historical religion bound to a sexist past. By 
' historical religion ', Hampson means that Christianity cannot exist without Jesus Christ 
as its founding reality and central religious symbol. What he said and did is authoritat ive 
and is invariantly foundational for Christian dogma and practice. Jesus Christ is the 
vehicle by which God enters history, making Christianity what it is. One cannot be 
2 Rosemary Radford Ruether & Daphne Hampson, "Is There a Place for Feminists in the Cathol ic Church," 
New Blaclifriars 68 no.80 I (January 1987): 7-24, p. 7 (hereafter is There a Place?). 
3 ibid. 
15 
Christian, or a Christian feminist, without referring to that history or the Christian story 
surrounding the birth, death, and resurrection of Christ. Hampson states: 
What I am saying is that it is not simply that Christianity 
arose in history: all ideas arise in history, and bear the 
imprint of the time when they arose. But that Christianity 
sees certain historical events as revelation. Christianity is 
not simply a message about loving one's neighbor; it is 
bound up with a particular historical person, Jesus Christ, 
about whom Christians say more than just that he was a 
good man.4 
Hampson regards this historical 'rootedness' of Christianity in Christ as decisive 
for feminists. It is not so much that Jesus Christ was sexist. Rather, the culture and 
history to which Christianity is irrevocably bound was an ideal medium for the 
emergence of sexism and invariably justified the sexist ideologies that feminists work to 
ameliorate. She writes, "Women have less stake in a re ligion which comes from the past. 
They have not been accorded the privilege of being counted equal within that religion. 
Moreover, the religion has been formulated by men."5 Hampson finds evidence of this 
sexism "in a myriad of ways in the religion. "6 The extended use of male metaphors 
makes a tremendous difference in the status of women and men in biblical narratives and 
an overwhelming preponderance of men in leadership roles in the gospels. 7 For 
Hampson, the anthropomorphism inherent within Christianity weighs heavily on the post-
4 Ibid., 8 
5 !bid., 13 
6 Ibid. 
7 Paul 's epistles for instance indicate there is some evidence of women in leadership roles in the early 
Church. See Romans 16: I, 16:3, 16:7 in, The New Testament: King James Version (Hendrickson 
Publishers, Inc., 2005). 
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Christian feminist 'attitude' and justifies the view that Christianity poses a threat to the 
full liberation of women. Thus, " it is not that [Christianity] is inextricably rooted in one 
particular history but that the history in which it is rooted is a history of patriarchal ism. "
8 
Hampson deems the history of patriarchal social relations as irreversible and permeating, 
concluding Christianity is unable to accommodate contemporary feminist consciousness. 
She writes, "The religion cannot be freed of this historical context. The sexism of that 
context is always going to be present together with the religion. If one reads the Bible one 
hears of a society which is sexist. The medium is the message. Symbol systems are 
powerful. "9 Thus, Hampson asserts that the historical origins of the Christian myth 
matter. " It matters because religion has profound ethical implications. It affects relations 
between human beings. If Christianity is necessarily sexist, and I have argued that it is, it 
will continue to distort, as it has in the past, relations between men and women."
10 
To that 
end, just as feminists themselves cannot exist within the Church, so Christian faith has no 
part to play in feminist critiques of patriarchy. 
1.1.2 Ruether 
Rosemary Radford Ruether agrees that Christianity was and is pervasively 
patriarchal. She writes, 
I would be the last to deny this since I have spent the last 
eighteen years demonstrating this fact. I reject the idea that 
somewhere back in the past, at the time of Jesus and the 
8Ruether and Hampson, Is There a Place, p. 13 
9/bid., p. 9 
10/bid., p. 13 
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early Church, everything was right for women. It is not 
simply a matter of returning to some original, good, 
equalitarian Christianity that gleamed like a flash in the pan 
for a few minutes in the first century and then vanished 
from sight. There are indeed many flashes of alternative 
possibilities that included women, in past periods of 
Christianity. But these will never amount to an alternative 
norm.
11 
Ruether, however, disagrees with the post-Christian conclusion and specifically opposes 
Hampson's logic pertaining to the sexism pervading the cornerstone of Christianity. In 
questioning Hampson's convictions, Ruether maintains that Hampson's argument is 
defective in a ' myriad of ways.' First, eliminating the role of faith , rejecting the Church 
or leaving Christianity for other religions such as paganism will not solve the problem 
post-Christians are facing. Though Christianity has been and continues to be patriarchal, 
"so has been post-Christian Western culture of the Enlightenment. Historical liberalism, 
socialism and psychoanalysis have been patriarchal, have either ignored women or sought 
to justify their subordination in new ways."12 Broadening the context, Ruether argues that 
most "histories" are patriarchal; Christianity is one among many institutions distorting 
relations between men and women. Recognizing the implications of this fact, she asks 
rhetorically, 
II Ibid., p. 19 
12/bid. 
How, then, do we find any cultural base for feminism? Is 
feminism totally bereft of precedent and cultural memories 
upon which to draw? I don't think this is the case. Although 
males have monopolized the shaping of public culture until 
now and used it to justify their own dominance, they have 
not only been about the justification of their own 
dominance in their various creations of religion, 
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philosophy, literature and science. They have also been 
about their own emancipation from the systems of 
alienation and domination, either as sensitive, creative 
persons from within cultural elite, or as insightful 
visionaries and liberators within oppressed communities.13 
Sexism, thus, is not exclusive to Christianity. Dismissing the role of faith and/or 
advocating for the break from traditional Christianity is not going to reconcile faith and 
feminism. Ruether advises that feminists can remain at, and work from, its core to effect 
greater change within the institution and affect the Christian values that inform social 
norms in a feminist and positive way. This leads to her second point: the fundamental 
precepts of Christianity are compatible with feminist aims, and feminism and Christianity 
need one another. She notes, 
These insights and many others belie the patriarchal 
construction of Christianity. The restatement of these 
insights in our context can be enormously fruitful for 
developing a feminist culture of emancipation. But we 
should be clear that we are restating these insights in the 
context of women's experience, not pretending that this was 
its original context. The norm for Christians, and for 
feminists, is not an idealized past, but the fullness of 
redemptive potential yet to be fully realized. To locate the 
norm of truth in a closed past is not only to be unhistorical; 
it is to betray the key Christian insight that it lives, not by 
the letter of the past, but by the presence of the spirit that 
comes from the eschatological future. 14 
Ruether therefore agrees that Christianity is patriarchal, but not at its core. It is her 
belief that the basic message of Jesus Christ is not a sexist dialogue that breeds and 
perpetuates the dynamics of oppression. Rather, scholarly interpretations of Jesus ' words 
13/bid. 
14 Ibid. , pp. 20-21 
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reflect a socia lly constructed patriarchalism. In this context, one can and should be free to 
choose to be a feminist and retain Christian faith to eradicate gender bias if they will to 
do so. 
1.2 What to do about God? Conceptualizing the Debate 
Feminist theology, combining as it does the concerns of 
modern theology with socio-political concerns of the 
broader feminist movement, can be analyzed therefore as a 
subset of either of these two worlds of thought. This is 
sometimes cause for confusion and debate. The charge is 
sometimes raised from the side of Christian thinkers that 
feminist theologians are more committed to feminism than 
to Christian theology. Conversely, non-Christian feminists 
sometimes claim that Christian feminist theologians' 
allegiance to the Christian tradition, with all its patriarchal 
underpinnings, renders their work untenable. 15 
In terms of the Hampson-Ruether debate, the question of the compatibility of 
feminism and Christianity undoubtedly affects the contribution of post-Christians and 
reformists to the overall body of feminist literature. Yet, to note these difficulties is not to 
conclude that the task of resolving the dilemma is futile . The effort to liberate women 
from religious oppression has been substantial in both secular and religious realms; 
feminist theologians have incorporated many elements of secular feminism and secular 
feminists have learned from feminist theologians' experience and analysis of religiou 
patriarchy. "Is There a Place for Feminists in a Christian Church?" captures well the 
ongoing dilemma and addresses the broader issues within feminist theological circles in 
two ways. First, it highlights different visions of the role of female spirituality and 
15Kathryn Greene-McCreight, Feminist Reconstructions of Christian Doctrine: Narrative Analysis and 
Appraisal (London: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 28. 
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feminism in religion. Second, it defines a precise cause for the break in the thought of 
feminist theologians, that is, the role of faith in the feminist critique of patriarchy.
16 
Having examined the basic positions in post-Christian feminism and reform 
feminism as illustrated in the Ruether/Hampson debate, we turn in the next section to a 
consideration of the broader aims of each school of thought and the basic methodological 
and conceptual differences that make an already heated debate even more difficult to 
resolve. Here we ask what each feminist theology proposes to 'do about God ' . 
1.2.1 Post-Christian Feminism 
Religion is potent. It has been the most potent ideology the 
world has known for undermining the integrity of women 
as first-class members of humanity. If we are to create a 
world in which men and women are held to be equal, then, 
I contend, we are either going to have to become atheists 
(which is not I think the way forward) or we must aspire to 
a post-Christian religious position. At the end of the day it 
must be said that if God be good, then God cannot 
commensurate with a religion which is sexist. 17 
Echoing post-Christian feminist thought, Elizabeth Schussler Fiorenza, a feminist 
biblical critic, argues that traditional religion operates with gender-bias and is, thus, a source 
of eternal untruth, repression, and domination. 18 She asks that the verb God be replaced with 
16 See Patricia Wilson Kastner, Faith, Feminism & the Christ (Philade lphia: Fortress Press, 1983), pp. 1-
37; Elisabeth Schussler Fiorenza, " Bread Not Stone", in A Reader of f eminist Knowledge, ed. Sneja Gunew 
(London: Routledge, 1991 ), pp. 263-276. 
17 Hampson, 1996, p. 14. See also Linda Woodhead, "Spiritualizing the Sacred" in The Practice of 
Theology: A Reader , eds. Colin E. Gunton, Sephen R. Holmes and Murray Rae (London: SCM Press, 
200 I), pp. 399-405 and Pamela Dickey Young in Feminist Theology/Christian Theology: In Search of a 
Method (Fortress Press; Minneapolis, 1990), p.ll and Emi lie Townes " Womanist Theology" in The 
Practice of Theology: A Reader , eds. Colin E. Gunton, Sephen R. Holmes and Murray Rae (Canterbury: 
SCM Press, 200 I), p. 405 . 
18 See Elisabeth Schussler Fiorenza, " Bread Not Stone," pp. 263-276. 
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the abstract verb ' Be/ing', "or with a universal principle, a 'cosmic matrix ', which in the 
minds of some is identified with nature/creation/humanity." 19 Thus, according to Fiorenza, 
both linguistic and textual interpretations only further reveal that the Church legitimizes 
victimization and will always do so.20 
The effect of this is not to be underestimated. The Bible is 
not just read as any literature but as scripture. For it to be 
read as revelation to a congregation tends to reinforce 
sexism. It affects human relations today when stories and 
histories are read which convey that male is the norm for 
being human, and in which God is predominately seen 
through male metaphors. Nor does it help to read stories 
about women, however brave those women may be, if they 
are still subordinate.21 
Similarly, the works of post-Christian feminist Mary Daly, such as Beyond God 
the Father and Gyn/ecology, and Naomi Goldenberg's Changing of the Gods: Feminism 
and the End ofTraditional Religion, ground the revolutionary or post-Christian femini st 
position on Christology.22 Daly's and Goldenberg's works strongly insist that both 
Judaism and Christianity are patriarchal at their foundations and women seeking their 
own individuality must reject these traditional religions. 23 Goldenberg makes it clear that 
19 Elisabeth Schussler Fiorenza, "Bread Not Stone," pp. 263-276. See also Sharon James, "An Introduction 
to Feminist Theology" on Theology Network: http://www.theologynetwork.org/theology-of-
everyth i ng/getting-stuck-in/an-overview-of- fern in ist-theo logy .htm 
20 Ibid. See also Mary Grey, "Feminist Theology: A Critical theology of Liberation" in The Cambridge 
Guide to Liberation Theology, ed. Christopher Rowland (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) 
pp. 89-106. 
21 Ruether and Hampson, Is There a Place?, p. 9. 
22 The later works of post-Christian feminist Mary Daly, such as Beyond God the Father: Towards a 
Philosophy of Women's Liberation (Boston: Beacon Press, 1985) and later in Gyn/ecology: The Metaethics 
of Radical Feminism (Boston: Beacon Press, 1990) ground the contemporary post-Christian pos ition on 
compatibility. Naomi Goldenberg's Changing of the Gods: Feminism and the End ofTraditional Relig ion 
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1979) grounds the fundamenta l position of revolutionary or post-Christian feminists 
on Christo logy. See also the new introduction of Mary Daly, The Church and the Second Sex (London: 
Harper & Row, 1975 edition). In 1968, Daly was a rad ical Catholic theologian who underwent a change a 
consciousness and by 1975, Daly was a post-Christian feminist philosopher. 
23 Wilson-Kastner, Faith. Feminism & the Christ. 
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the derogatory nature of the Christian church lies in not only the masculine language but 
lies deeply within its principal images and symbols. She states: 
Jesus Christ cannot symbolize the liberation of women. A 
culture that maintains a masculine image for its highest 
divinity cannot allow its women to experience themselves 
as the equals of men. In order to develop a theology of 
women's liberation, feminists have to leave Christ and the 
Bible behind them.24 
The post-Christian feminist aims to have women' s voices heard, sexist language 
acknowledged, and women's experiences in both private and public spheres valued. Their 
alternative methodology aims to replace sexist language with gender-neutral language, to 
embrace forms of religions that arise solely from women's experience, and to divorce 
itself from traditional Christianity. By disputing the authority of the sacred texts of the 
Church and introducing a new religion, Goldenberg claims, "We women are going to 
bring an end to God." 25 In a similar vein, Carol Christ and Judith Plascow in 
Womenspirit Rising lay out possibilities for contemporary alternatives to traditional 
religions such as neo-pagan spirituality and the return to worship of the Mother goddess, 
24 See Naomi Goldenberg, Changing of the Gods (Boston: Beacon Press, 1979) p. 22. 
25 Ibid. See also Lynn Hankinson, "The Very Idea of Feminist Epistemology," in Is Feminist Philosophy 
Ibid. See also Lynn Hankinson, "The Very Idea of Feminist Epistemology," in Is Feminist Philosophy 
Philosophy? ed. Emanuela Bianchi (Illinois: Northwestern university Press, 1999), pp.l67- 189. Many 
secular feminists also argue that sexism narrows the cognitive sphere for women. See Lorraine Code, What 
Can She Know? (New York: Cornell University Press, 1991). Code criticizes the Bible on linguistic 
grounds for its use of gendered language of God, and the subsequent negative effects of it on the female 
psyche. 
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often accompanied by a form of feminist witchcraft. Other feminists adopt forms of 
humanism centered on notions of 'sisterhood', or focus on individual spiritual quest.
26 
1.2.2 Reformist Feminism 
It was 1975 when Mary Daly signaled the beginning of reformist feminist 
discourse. She writes, "Rather than a philosophy of despair, we choose a theology of 
hope, not because the former is 'false', but because we think it represents an incomplete 
and partial version.',27 While Daly abandoned the reform position, present day reformist 
feminists recognize both the liability and the potential of a new, authentic Christian 
tradition as a foundation for social justice.28 Reformist feminists have appropriated the 
economic, social, political , and gender/identity concerns of 1960's secular femin ists in 
their approach to understanding the Christian tradition. Scholars such as Phyllis Trible 
and Rosemary Radford Ruether have re-examined Christian religious history. Their 
analyses confirm a history of patriarchal oppression in Christianity. Yet, they also 
26 For expanded and interesting older versions of ' sisterhood ' see, Carol P. Christ, Diving Deep and 
Surfacing: Women writers on the Spiritual Quest (Boston: Beacon Press, 1980) and Penelope Wash born, 
Becoming Woman (New York: Harper & Row, 1977). For information of trad itions based in physical-
psychological experience and women 's religion as witchcraft, see Starhawk, The Spiral Dance (New York: 
Harper & Row, 1979). Again, as previously noted, for an excellent work on humanist and spiritual quest 
alternatives see Wilson-Kasner, Faith, Feminism & the Christ. 
27See Daly, Church and the Second Sex, p. 223. 
28Within this particular critique, scholars suggest interpretations of the ' canon' that reflect individual 
female experience. Both post-Christian biblical feminists such as Elizabeth Schussler Fiorenza, and 
reformist theologians adopt a variety of hermeneutic approaches. A hermeneutic of suspicion questions the 
Biblical writers' interpretation on various events. A hermeneutic of proclamation affirms a canon within a 
canon, that is, it reaffirms the authenticity of the Church by proclaiming those parts of the Bible that 
affirms liberation and it rejects the rest of the text. To retrieve and pay tribute to the suffering of biblical 
women (who were victims of patriarchy) is to use a hermeneutic of remembrance. Finally, the most 
creative in my opinion and yet most likely the one considered to be fundamentally problematic, is a 
hermeneutic of actualization. Thus involves rewriting the Bible in order to 'put back' otherwise forgonen 
women. 
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unearthed positive contributions of women to the tradition that involved considerable 
diversity in women's experiences of religion.29 Informed by these discoveries, their 
direction and focus has moved beyond mere criticism towards a recovery of the authentic 
elements of Christian theology.30 Rosemary Radford Ruether, Marianne Micks, Letty 
Russell , and Sally McFague all continue to construct this new feminist theology.
31 
Of 
particular interest is the work of the Canadian theologian Pamela Dickey Young, who in 
Feminist Theology/Christian Theology: In Search of a Method, explicitly addresses the 
question, how can one be both of faith and be a feminist and remain authentic? She 
argues that despite the history of gender oppression in the churches, Christian faith not 
only provides strength for sustaining daily life, but also has made a positive contribution 
32 
to the emergence of human freedom. 
1.3 Other Feminist Scholars on the Debate 
Many Christian feminists, such as Nicola Slee, Jane Shaw, Julie Hopkins, and Sarah 
Coakley, to name a few, have all gone head to head and, seemingly, heart-to-heart with not 
only the question of what to do about God but with Daphne Hampson. In the article, "The 
29Rosemary Radford Ruether, Sexism and God Talk: Towards a Feminist Theology (Boston: Beacon Press, 
1993), pp. 4-5. Added to the list of scholars are Joan Morris, and Eleanor McLaughlin . See Phyllis Trib le, 
God and the Rhetoric of Sexuality, Overtures to Biblical theology (Philade lphia: Fortress Press, 1978). 
30Similar work has been done in Jewish reform. See Martha C. Nussbaum, "Judaism and the Love of 
Reason," in Philosophy, Feminism, and Faith (Indiana: University of Indiana Press, 2003), pp. 9-39. 
31See for example Letty Russel, Human Liberation in a Feminist Perspective- A Theology (Philadelphia: 
Westminster Press, 1974) and Marianne H. Micks, Our Search for Identity: Humanity in the Image of God 
(Philade lphia: Fort-ress Press, 1982). 
320n the religious roots of Western notions of freedom, see the collection of essays, Liberal Democracy 
and the Bible, ed. K.l. Parker (Lewiston/Queenston/Lampeter: Mellen, 1992). Patricia Wilson-Kastner in 
Faith, Feminism and the Christ makes a similar argument. 
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Power to Re-member," Slee notes that, one can be both Christian and feminist only if 
"Christian identity is understood in a sufficientl y flexible and dynamic way; only if 
Christian identity is open to continual renewal, reformation and transformation; and only if 
33 
feminism itself is permitted to become an agent of Christianity's own transformation." 
Unlike Hampson, Slee considers Christianity and feminism to be fluid , unfixed systems that 
are changing and developing in light of each other. They are complex inter-related traditions 
34 
whose identities are "most capable of creative transformation at times of deepest crisis." 
Slee takes an approach that challenges and subverts patriarchal world-views in the Christian 
texts, and then reconstructs the parables as stories of "radical freedom , responsibility and 
. . 35 
creat1 VI ty." 
Jane Shaw bases her argument for the compatibility of Christianity and femi nism, in 
"Women, Rationality and Theology," on the notion of female subjectivity. Questioning 
whether a woman can be both Christian and feminist involves consideration of "the social, 
cultural, and psychic construction of what it means to be a woman (and a Christian) and, in 
turn, how we position ourselves as women in relation to the Christian position."
36 
She 
challenges a basic assumption in the debate, that all women experience Christianity and 
feminism in the same way across cultures, societies, fami lies, and individuals. She demands 
the question: Whose feminism and whose Christianity do we consider? 
33See Nicole Slee, "The Power to Re-member," in Swallowing a Fishbone: Feminist Theologians Debate 
Theology, ed. Daphne Hampson (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996), p. 33 . 
34/bid. 
35/bid. , pp. 41-42. 
36Jane Shaw, "Women, Rationality and Theology," in Swallowing a Fishbone: Feminist Theologians 
Debate Christianity, ed. Daphne Hampson (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996), p. 50. 
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In "Radical Passion: A Feminist Liberation Theology," Hopkins understands 
Christianity to be key player in the development of socially prescribed, and symbolically 
structured, subordination of women. However, she contends that, 
Feminism is the political movement of women who, by 
applying an analysis of the inequality of power between the 
sexes to their culture, society and personal relationships, 
hope to develop anew female historical subjectivity beyond 
or on the boundaries of patriarchy.37 
Lastly, Sarah Coakley in "Kenosis and Subversion: On the Repression of 
'Vulnerability' in Christian Feminist Writing," discusses a "matter [which] cuts close to the 
heart of what separates Christian and post-Christian feminism," namely kenosis - ' the 
voluntary self-emptying on the part of the second person of the Trinity '. On the one hand, 
Daphne Hampson states, "For women, the theme of self-emptying and self-abnegation is far 
from helpful as a paradigm."38 On the other hand, Ruether argues, "Jesus ' self-emptying 
offers a challenge to patriarchy."39 In the attempt to reconcile both ends, Coakley thereby 
contends that, though kenosis is painful as the new self struggles to emerge, " it is also 
transformative and empowering, it is what finally keeps me a Christian as well as a 
40 
feminist." 
37Julie Hopkins, " Radical Passion," in Swallowing a Fishbone: Feminist Theologians Debate Christianity, 
ed. Daphne Hampson (London: SPCK, 1996), p. 66. 
38Sarah Coakley, "Kenosi s and Subversion: On the Repression of ' Vulnerability ' in Christian Feminist 
Writing," in Swallowing a Fishbone: Feminist Theologians Debate Christianity, ed. Daphe Hampson, 
(London: SPCK, 1996), p. 89. See a lso Daphne Hampson, Theology and Feminism (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1990), p. 155. 
39See Rosemary Radford Ruether, Sexism and God-talk: Towards a Feminist Theology (Boston: Beacon 
Press, 1993),pp. 137-8. 
4
°Coakley, " Kenosis and Subversion," in Swallowing a Fishbone, p. I I I. 
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1.4 My Position 
My own intention is to focus on the notion of gender bias and turn the notion of 
patriarchy on its head, so to speak. In Lonergan's social philosophy, patriarchy and gender 
discrimination emerge as a symptom of group bias, not its cause. I aim to show that faith and 
feminism are more than compatible; they are both integral to the feminist movement. To do 
this I must construct a foundation for bridging faith-based values and secular feminist 
critiques of patriarchy. In order to narrow our scope and refine the focus of the thesis we 
will not tackle head on Hampson's arguments on the ontological status of Christ. To delve 
into a philosophical analysis of the ontological existence of Christ is far beyond my present 
ability and, as Charles C. Hefting notes, 
[E]ven if the philosophical and a priori objection to Jesus' 
uniqueness were to be answered, an objection on the ethical 
grounds would remain, namely that because the person to 
whom Christianity ascribes a unique and saving relationship 
with God was a male, the symbols that convey Christian 
meaning have been, and cannot help being, such as to exclude 
women and deny their equality with men. 41 
In my view, Hampson's position is ultimately ethical and symbol ic in nature. She is 
right to maintaint that "symbolic mediations of the meaning and value that were incarnate in 
Jesus' life and death must include, as in fact they have included, his maleness."42 Yet, 
Hampson is incorrect to contend that feminism and Christianity are irremediably at odds. In 
a sociological sense, meaning and value - even Christian meanings and values - are socially 
constructed and, even when biased, may be reconstituted over time. Faith creates the 
possibility of reform. From this implication, if we are to move forward, two founding 
41 See Charles Hetling, "On the Poss ible Relevance of Lonergan's Thought," p.212 
42 Ibid., p. 202. 
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premises are evident: first, a critique of patriarchy needs to account for the existential real ity 
of faith and faith based values; and second, the critique of patriarchy must consider 
Hampson' s insights that Christianity is a historical religion with an inherently sexist past. 
Let us move on. 
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Chapter 2: Laying a Foundation: The Human Subject 
Applying the notion of the dialectic of history to problems in feminist social 
theory is a promising approach for restoring the integrity of Christian values and bridging 
the gap between faith, traditional religion, and feminism. The dialectic of history, 
however, is a broad framework premised on a structured foundational philosophy. To 
understand Lonergan's notion of the dialectic of history and its potential application to 
the question of the thesis, we need to establish its basis in his understanding of the 
process of deliberation. This chapter functions as a foundation for the more central task 
by drawing out the accounts of consciousness, knowing, and deliberation that underpin 
Lonergan's paradigm. The hope is to clarify how the dialectic works in terms of the 
individual human subject, preparing us to explore how the unfolding of individual 
operations transfer into community and the collective processes that constitute the 
dialectic of history - progress, decline, redemption. 
The first section briefly articulates the cognitive foundation of the human subject. 
The second section explores the metaphysical and dialectical foundations of the human 
subject and consciousness. The third section focuses on the structure of, and relationship 
between, the inner dialectic ofthe subject and the larger dialectic of history. 
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2.1 Lonergan's Theory of Knowing 
Lonergan once remarked that the structure of dialectic is identical with the 
structure of individual free choice.' Lonergan' s understanding of human deliberation is 
itself a development ofthe critical realist position ofThomas Aquinas, found in its most 
mature expression in the "prima secundae part is " of the Summa Theologiae.2 Aquinas 
had expressed his understanding of human knowing and the process of deliberation in the 
metaphysical terms of 13th century scholastic philosophy. In Insight, Lonergan used a 
method he named self-appropriation. As it rests within the human subject, this religious 
dynamic mirrors the cognitive processes and the creative urgency manifest in the process 
of self-appropriation, a process considered to be the "correcting agent" for flights from 
understanding, or the center from which all " intellectual achievement radiates."3 
As will become explicit, Lonergan' s "ultimate concern ... remains the 
appropriation of rational self-consciousness, of oneself as not only a knower but also as 
freely and responsibly deciding and acting."4 Lonergan brilliantly transposed Aquinas' s 
metaphysical account of knowing into a modern context by making explicit its implicit 
cognitional theory. In this way, he could easily relate Aquinas's basic positions to 
contemporary debates about consciousness, praxis, history, and human freedom. 
1 Quoted in Michael Shute, Origins of Lonergan 's Notion of the Dialectic of Hist01y: A Study of 
Lonergan's Early Wiritngs on History (London: University Press of America, 1993), xxx from unpublished 
notes. [" Education, Definition of," Education Folder 55 (1949) Lonergan Archives] (hereafter OLNDH). 
2 We find Aquinas' account of human knowing in Summa Theologiae, Ia- I qq .79-86 and his account of 
deliberation in STI-ll QQ pp. 1-18. 
3 Shute, OLNDH, p. 12. See also, Bernard Lonergan, Method in Theology (New York: The Seabury Press, 
1972). 
4 The Lonergan Reader, Ed. Mark D. Morell i and Elizabeth A. Morelli (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 1997), p. 445. 
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It is this transposition and its application to the philosophy of history that is our concern. 
We begin with consciousness, follow with a broad overview of the basic cognitional 
structure and dive into an examination of the main element driving Lonergan's 
perspective, self-appropriation. 
2. 1.1 Consciousness 
A working notion of consciousness is a grounding instrument for Lonergan's 
thought. However, Lonergan sharply distinguishes consciousness from knowledge. To be 
conscious is simply to be aware, to be present to one "self. 'Such awareness involves 
both an intended object and the act of attending to the intended object. To that end, we 
can be conscious in two ways. First, we may be conscious of what we are attending, the 
object in question or in sight, constituting the data of sense. Second, we can be conscious 
of ourselves as attending the object in sight. In each person, the two acts inextricably 
relate because the act of seeing constitutes data of consciousness. Without the act of 
seeing, there is no object seen. This act of attending is therefore intentional insofar as the 
conscious act of seeing intends the object of sight. Being subjects of such acts, we are 
brought into awareness of what we actually intend. To be conscious of an object, 
however, is not to necessarily know the object. For example, we may be conscious of a 
person approaching us, but we may not know who it is. To discover who it is requires 
something more. Similarly, we may be aware of a feeling of disquiet without knowing 
what the feeling means. We can say that knowledge requires consciousness; without it, 
we have nothing to know. However, both consciousness and the process of knowledge 
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tend towards an object. In the first instance, it is a conscious object of consciousness; in 
the second instance, it is an object of knowledge. 
Lonergan's achievement was making explicit these structures as they illustrate 
how human beings know. Indeed, understanding how the human subject understands is 
the foundation for his entire philosophy. As we will discover, Lonergan's actual 
cognitional theory depends on a method of self-appropriation for its proof; the method of 
self-appropriation depends on the functioning of the cognitive processes to actualize. 5 
This section examines the method of self-appropriation, and then explores the cognitional 
structure that the method of self-appropriation reveals. 6 I will examine some ofthe 
implications of the method of self-appropriation for the thesis topic later in the chapter. 
2.1. 2 Self-Appropriation 
The cognitional structure emerges out of a process of what Lonergan terms self-
appropriation. Self-appropriation is a method for self-knowledge and it moves the subject 
to know in two ways. First, the subject may be moved to a heightened awareness of the 
acts occurring when we are knowing or attending to the data, the object seen/observed. 
Second, while attending to the data or object we are seeing, we may also attend to our 
own act of attending to the data, thereby moving ourselves to a heightened consciousness, 
one that includes both acts, and therefore includes the data of sense and the data of 
consciousness. This is conscious intentionality. Indeed, self-discovery is a daunting and 
common task. Lonergan made his own task the discovery of the process by which we 
5 See Bernard Lonergan, Insight: A Study of Human Understanding in Collected Works of Bernard 
Lonergan (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992), p. 22. 
6 For more information, see Frederick E. Crowe, "An Exploration of Lonergan's New Notion of Value," 
Science et £spirit 29 ( 1977): pp. 123-43. 
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reveal ourselves to ourselves, come to know how it is we know. Lonergan called this 
' first leg' of the journey in self-appropriation, and this process reflects the effort needed 
to be aware of and disseminate the elements involved in ' knowing'. 
Lonergan made it a point to distinguish between certain 'conscious' acts. 
Knowledge and expression are distinct; expression is a bound act of communication that 
involves knowledge, and hopefully self-knowledge, and language - both non-verbal and 
verbal. Language plays an important role in transcending immediate basic needs and 
expressions of the immediate present. As Lonergan writes, it is in language that "meaning 
finds its greatest liberation."7 Once the child leaves the world of mumbling and baby talk, 
for instance, she moves from that world of immediacy and break into the world mediated 
by meaning. 8 The acquisition of language is a key moment in the breakthrough, for 
"words denote not only what is present but also what is absent or past or future, not only 
what is factual but also the possible, the ideal, the normative."9 It is in the world of 
meaning we can reconstruct the past, inform the present, and imagine a different future in 
which we can explore creative possibilities that might transform current limitations in our 
decisions and actions, or our horizons, if you will. 
Not all expression, of course, is an outcome of understanding. Prior expression is 
equivalent to animal expression. Yet, at the root of this human creativity and its 
expression of meaning is a quest for understanding. Lonergan establishes a common 
structure of the quest, even though personal understanding and expression may differ. As 
7 Lonergan, Method in Theology, p. 70. 
8 Ibid, pp. 28, 76, 89, 112, 238, 263, 303. 
9 Ibid , p. 70. 
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Aristotle put it at the beginning his Metaphysics: "All human beings by nature desire to 
know." 10 In this view, all humans have an innate capacity to wonder, so evident in the 
child who persistently asks "why?" Though the field of inquiry broadens with subsequent 
maturation, we struggle with, and thereby return to, basic questions about who we are and 
what that means both in our own personal lived experience and present social 
environment and with respect to the broader questions. In short, human beings seek to 
orient themselves as subjects in a world of meaning and value encompassing their 
origins, their destiny, and their place with respect to each. Ultimately, the quest for 
knowledge is largely a quest for self-knowledge, albeit a quest shared with others. 
Self-knowledge can be of two kinds. At the practical level we may reflect on why 
we do the things we do. We become aware of our preference and attitudes. We learn from 
our successes and mistakes by reflecting on the consequences of our decisions and 
adjusting our future actions. For Lonergan there is, however, a more technical notion of 
self-knowledge that involves the adoption of a methodological heightening of 
consciousness, which he calls self-appropriation. Self-appropriation is the process of 
making explicit the common structure of cognition and deliberation that informs any 
particular knowledge or choice of action. It is not simple knowing. Rather, it is to know 
how it is we know. It is to understand how we understand. When this type of self-
knowledge is fully developed, it can distinguish and relate the various acts and levels of 
human conscious intentionality involved in human knowing. It can differentiate and 
relate the various kinds of human knowing. It potentially heightens authenticity in actions 
10 See Aristotle, Metaphysics, translated by W.D.Ross, Book I http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/ 
metaphysics. htm l 
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and decisions because it renders not only the content that informs the flow of stages in the 
cognitive process itself but renders all societal norms subject to critique. The root of all 
ways of knowing is a cognitional structure, including the knowledge that directs 
decisions and actions. 
2. 1. 3 Conscious Intentionality and Cognitional Structure 
In Insight, Lonergan establishes that his account of cognitional structure is the 
foundation fo r all types of human inquiry. 11 He writes, "Thoroughly understand what it is 
to understand, and not only will you understand the broad lines of all there is to be 
understood but also you will possess a fixed base, an invariant pattern, opening all further 
developments ofunderstanding." 12 While the zones of inquiry differ from each other, 
they nonetheless share the common structure of all human inquiry. During the course of 
Insight, Lonergan explores the common cognitional structure as it occurs in mathematics 
the empirical sciences, common sense practicality, aesthetic appreciation and artistic 
practice, human development, the human sciences, epistemology, metaphysics, ethics and 
the philosophy of relig ion. In all cases, he establishes the relevance of his general 
position on knowing to the particular kind of knowledge in each zone of inquiry. For 
example, while the goals of common sense and theory differ - common sense knowledge 
11 For an expanded version of the cognitional structure see "Natural Right and Historical Mindedness," in 
Proceedings, American Catholic Philosophical Association 15 ( 1977) [reprinted in A Third Collection: 
Papers by Bernard Lonergan, ed. Fred E . Crowe, S.J . (New York: Paulist Press and London: Geoffrey, 
Chapmen, 1985) , p. 177 and Lonergan, Method in Theology, pp. 85-99, and Lonergan, " Dimensions of 
Meaning," in Collection, ed. Frederick E. Crowe, S.J. (New York: Herder and Herder, 1967), pp. 232-45 
12 Lonergan, Insight, p. 22. The basis of Lonergan 's comprehensive approach is a cognitional analysis that 
he maintains provides the necessary foundations for a ll types of human inquiry. 
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concerns practical specific applications, theoretical knowledge concerns universal terms, 
and relations - nonetheless both involve acts of experiencing, understanding, judging, 
and deliberation. Lonergan's account of the basic cognitional structure therefore 
identifies four distinct yet related levels of conscious intentionality: experience, 
understanding, judgment, and decision. 13 Decisions may be further subdivided into 
planning and evaluation. Each level represents one component in a unified dynamic 
structure. 14 The following examines each in turn. 
An experiential component is inherent in all levels of knowing, and experience is 
therefore a necessary feature of all levels of this cognition structure. Yet, the process of 
human knowing for Lonergan begins with an experience specifically pertaining to 
retrieving data as potential knowledge, by both sense and consciousness. We attend to the 
level of experience when we attend to the objects of sense and attend to the sensitive flow 
of conscious experience. Without the data which experience provides there would be 
nothing to understand. As simply experienced, the data is prior to any questions we may 
have about it. Actual human inquiry begins at the second level as it is here that we have a 
need to understand and make sense of the data. Such a need or question shifts us to the 
next level of the cognitional structure, that ofunderstanding. Lonergan writes: 
Our experience includes a -flow of presentations but the -flow is directed by 
our conscious attention, initially by what interests our senses. However, 
human intelligence can ask questions about such presentations. The object 
13 In Insight, Lonergan organized the cognitional structure on three levels: experience, understanding and 
judgment. Deliberation is treated as an extension of the three level structure. In Method in Theology, he 
reorganizes his account by adding a fourth level of decision. In the later account, the level of decision 
sublates the prior three levels. 
14 See Shute, OLNDH, p. 13. For more information, see Frederick E. Crowe, "An Exploration of 
Lonergan's New Notion of Value," Science et £spirit 29 ( 1977): pp. 123-43. 
37 
of our sensing provides us with material for questions because our sensing 
alone does not tell us what something is. 15 
Whereas experience provides the sense data, understanding distinguishes, names, 
groups and correlates the data presented. Questions of the type "what is it?" are questions 
for intelligence. Such questions take us beyond the "flow of sensitive data" in search of 
direct insights, which would unify the data in some new way. On this level the human 
subject is like a detective, seeking out the "what" and "how" of things. We sort out what 
is relevant and irrelevant in the data; we anticipate direct insights into the data; and we 
express our understanding in already established ideas, concepts, and hypotheses. The 
searching for, receiving of, and expression of insight, are the key acts on the second level 
of understanding. 
Insights and their expression on the level of understanding are neither correct nor 
incorrect and so different kinds of question emerge as to the correctness of the ideas or 
hypotheses formulated at the level of understanding. This evokes the shift into a third and 
higher level of conscious activity, the rational level. Here we ask, is it so? Whereas 
questions on the second level intend a formulation of an understanding, questions on the 
third level intend judgments of fact. "Understanding yields explanations. Judgment, in 
contrast, yields no explanation; it merely affirms or denies the explanation." 16 The 
explanations arrived at on the level of understanding are hereby judged within a notion 
15 Personal class notes, adopted from Shute, Religious Studies 2610 Course Manual, 2"d ed. (St. John's : 
Memoria l University Distance Education, 2000x). 
16 See Lonergan, Insight and Lonergan, Topics in Education, eds. Fred Crowe and Robert Doran (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1993). For more on objectivity of knowing and the Kantian view, and 
intersubjectivity, see Lonergan, Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan: Philosophical and Theological 
Papers, 1958-1964, eds. Fred Crowe and Robert Doran (Toronto: University ofToronto Press, 1996), pp. 
2 14-242. 
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that hypotheses could be true, probably true, probably false, or false; or we could 
conclude that we do not know. The point is that we make some judgment of fact. It is 
only in the act of judgment that we can fina lly c lai m to know. 
Fundamentally, the process of ' knowing ' is therefore a compound of acts of 
experiencing, understanding, and judging. Accordingly, in any instance of knowing sev n 
distinct acts occur on three distinct but related levels of conscious intentionality. On the 
level of experience there is (I) data; on the level of understanding there is (2) the question 
for intelligence; (3) the direct insight or insight into phantasm; and (4) the idea or 
hypothesis that expresses the meaning of the direct insight; on the level of judgment there 
is : (5), the question for judgment, (6) the reflective insight which compares the content of 
the idea proposed with the relevant data in li ght of the question asked and (7) the 
judgment of fact itse lf. We may schematize the process as illustrated in figure 
Judgment of Fact 
Formulation or 
Definition 
Figure 2. 1: First three levels in the process of knowing and conscious intentionality 
17 Diagram adapted from Michae l Shute and William Zanardi , Improving Moral Decision Making, 2"d ed 
(McGraw-Hi ll , 2003), p. 74 . 
39 
We can schematize the entire process, illustrated in figure 3, as a model of Practical 
Reasoning22 : 
What is to be 
done? 





The full acts of meaning making, for instance, are acts of "active judgments 
[which] come with judgments of value, decisions, actions."23 When one makes judgments 
of fact, there can be assurance that facts themselves cannot be wrong or corrupt. Facts are 
facts . They are verified in experience. Further, facts explain nothing but rather simply 
show or illustate what is the case. For instance, statistics may show that men get paid 
more than women in the university even though both are equally qualified with the same 
level of education. To be truly effective the statistic must be set in the context of of a 
22 Diagram adapted from Michael Shute and William Zanardi, Improving Moral Decision Making, 2"d ed 
(McGraw-Hill, 203), p. 74. 
23 Lonergan, Method in Theology, p. 74. 
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classical type theory which explains the relations between things. Attempting to know the 
why is important for figuring out whether or not to act on the knowledge, by altering the 
current policies and practicies and on what grounds. Still futher is the question of the 
relationship between theoretical results and practical application. In the contemporary 
context this question marks a crucial turning point. The practical person wants to know 
what to do. The goal is action. The theoretical person seeks to correctly understand the 
situation. The goal is universal understanding not action. How can the practical person 
qua practical select from the plurality of theoretical model avai lable to her? Similarily 
the theoretician has a related problem: How can the correct hypothesis be effectively 
implemented in practice? 
To develop a fourth level of decision-making is to prioritize praxis, highlighting 
that consciously intended decisions based in critical ethics direct our labors to understand 
our world and focus our efforts to effect positive change. We can understand this as 
Lonergan ' s response to Marx' s Eleventh Thesis on Feuerbach that "up to now, the 
philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point, however, is to 
change it." 24 Lonergan' s solution for effecting positive change was to develop a higher 
viewpoint which sublated both the practical world of common sense and the theoretical 
world. In his exploration of human interiority, especially as it is manifest in human 
cognitional process, he reveals how we can differentiate the theoretical from the practical 
and how we might structure the common ground between the two. Ultimately it was his 
24 Karl Marx, Theses on Feuerbach, (Thesis X!) , M arx/Engels Selected Works, Volume One, pp. 13 - 15 
(Paris: Progress Publishers, 1969). Lonergan ' s response to Marx is the Dialectic of History. See also, Karl 
Marx, The Poverty of Philosophy , (Paris: Progress Publishers, 1955). 
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discovery of functional specialization that provided the outline for negotiating the 
collaborative movement from theory to practice.25 For Lonergan, the implementation of 
the method of functional specialization would be the characterisitic feature of the arrival 
of the third stage of meaning. In this stage the method of functional specialization 
provides the context for directing future global action. It is his mature solution to the 
problem of specifying the 'differentials' of history. But we are getting ahead of ourselves. 
Let us return to the examination of value and human deliberation. 
In short, value and deliberation moves us to genuine interpretation and genuine 
responsibility. Genuine responsibility takes us beyond the cognitive process. The 
cognitive demand at the fourth level ofresponsibilty is therefore intelligent planning and 
evaluation. The test at this level is to strive for consistency between the judgements of 
value that result from planning and evaluating and the actions or inactions that follow. A 
responsible person must not only determine what is worthwhile, but must act on it. This 
is the exercise of authentic conscience that, in Lonergan's view, makes human beings 
genuinely free. In other words, the proper end of authenic deliberation results in 
responsible action which is what Lonergan meant by the human good. 26 The human good 
establishes the foundation of self-transcendence, a process involving a three-fold 
conversion that is intellectual, moral and religious. The following section examines this 
process. 
25 See Lonergan, Method in Theology, p. 153 ; p. 349. 
26 We will examine the notion of the human good in more detail in Chapter 3. See Lonergan, Method in 
Theology, pp. 47-51. 
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2.3 Self-Appropriation and the Religious Subject: A Notion of Conversion 
The method of self-appropriation and the cognitive structure implies a process of 
multiple conversions. Intellectual conversion involves a shift out of the position that 
'knowing is something like looking' to the position that knowing is 'correctly 
understanding experience.' It makes philosophically explicit the shift that occurs 
naturally in human development from 'the world of immediacy' to 'the world mediated 
by meaning. One is inveiling intellectual conversion when attending to the cognitional 
structure - the compound activity of experiencing, understanding, judging and believing 
this or that to be true or false. 
The notion of practical reasoning and deliberation, as grounded in a self-
appropriating conscious intentionality, concerns not only a heightening of awareness and 
attend ing to the deliberate steps in the cognitive processes but also the heightening of our 
moral horizon, leading to moral conversion. Moral conversion marks a change or shift in 
the criterion of one's decisions and choices from satisfaction to values. 
The movement towards moral conversion begins when one 
becomes aware of the fact that one is responsible for 
deciding what he or she wishes to be as a person. Moral 
conversion is that moment when one opts for what is truly 
worthwhile, valuable, and good as o~posed to what is 
merely satisfying or ego-regarding.2 
The "moral horizon" is referred to as the moral quest since it is an "expanded world . .. it 
is a world that is not only mediated by meaning but motivated by value."28 In this light, 
as Tad Dunne notes, the four levels of consciousness are also " levels of self-
27 Braman, Brian Joseph, " The Drama of human existence: Bernard Lonergan's notion of Authenticity," 
(PhD Thesis, Boston College, 1996, IV), p. iv 
28 Shute, Religious Studies 2610 Course Manual, r ' ed., (Section I), p. 40. 
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transcendence, meaning that they are the principal set of operations by which we 
transcend the solitary self and deal with the world beyond ourselves through our wonder 
and care. "29 The demand is for moral development. 
Of course, Lonergan's account of cognition and choice is philosophical, not 
specifically theological; the goal for the human subject is the development of a 
heightened self-appropriated decision-making. However, the method of self-
appropriation also implies a religious dimension oflife. If we recall, the method of self-
appropriation has the potential to rise "in the most intimate and personal manner the issue 
of authentic selfhood. "30 It offers general principles for the normative operation of human 
intentionality that can point towards avenues for the growth and expansion of human 
consciousness, both personal and collective. Progress, for instance, is not simply a 
demand for progress in technological skill, science or scholarly understanding. The 
demand is for a heightened level of openness, self-criticism, responsibility and 
authenticity - authenticity being obedience to exigencies for raising questions .31 The 
following section speaks to what Lonergan means by the religious operations inherent to 
the human subject. 
29 Dunne, "Bernard Lonergan ( 1904-1984)" in The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
http://www.iep.utm.edu/ l/ lonergan.htm, p.l5. See also Lonergan and Spirituality: Toward a Spiritual 
Integration . (Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1985). 
30 Dunne, Lonergan and Spirituality , p. 81 . 
31 For more on authenticity, see Lonergan, Method in Theology, pp. 36-52. 
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2. 3.1 Rational Self-Transcendence 
The theological virtues of faith, hope, and charity, which Lonergan named the 
supernatural conjugates, are relevant in his view on authentic moral decision-making. 32 
The basic religious orientation of the human subject, according to Lonergan, comes out 
of the search for the good and in the journey toward being fuller and more responsible, a 
moral quest that indeed directs the human subject to "self-transcendence." Lonergan 
writes, 
Self-transcendence reaches its term not in righteousness but 
in life and, when we fall in love, then life begins anew. A 
new principle takes over and, as long as it lasts, we are 
lifted up above ourselves and carried along as parts within 
an ever more intimate yet ever more liberating dynamic 
whole.33 
To that end, self-transcendence reveals all levels of conversion, and moral 
decision-making is self-transcendence manifest in human action. Determining what is 
worthwhile moves us beyond mere self-interest to authentic value and this promotes 
progress. Opening up to love and self-trancendence is what Lonergan understands to 
ground the religious component of our living. In Method in Theology, Lonergan writes, 
There is to be experienced one's experience, understanding, 
judging and deciding. But this fourfold experience is just 
consciousness. We have it each time we experience, 
understand, judge and decide. But our attention is apt to be 
focused on the object, while our conscious operating 
remains peripheral.34 
32 
' Supernatural conjugates is Lonergan's term for the theological virtues see index in Insight. 
33 Lonergan, Insight, p. 515. Self-transcendence is the fruit of religious conversion. As we will come to 
understand, " it sublates the entire Eros of the human spirit into higher supematural. .. this higher reality 
supplies the foundations for the element of redemption in the dialectic of history." Also see Shute, OLNDH, 
P,· 18 
4 See Lonergan, Method in Theology, pp. 14-15. 
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Understanding the notion of authenticity in terms of moral conversion, self-
appropriation, and responsible decision-making is important. Yet, given the complex 
issue of bias as it affects human deliberation and therefore the cumulative social situation, 
we are burdened with the question of how to counter bias and sustain the authenticity of 
our efforts to deliberate. For Lonergan, this raises the issue of religious conversion and 
the notion of rational self-consciousness. 
Rational self-consciousness is a peak above the clouds. 
Intelligent and reasonable, responsible and free , scientific 
and metaphysical, it stands above romantic sponteneity and 
the psychological depths, historial determinism and social 
engineering, the disconcerted existential subject and the 
undeciphered symbols of the artist and the modernist.35 
2.3.2 Moral Conversion versus Religious Conversion 
To clarify quickly the difference between the moral and the religious, any moral 
realism must observe the exigencies of human inquiry or wonder, that is, be attentive, be 
intelligent, and be reasonable. When we shift to deliberation, our wonder turns to 
concern and there emerges the further exigencies needed to plan intelligently, evaluate 
wisely, and act responsibly. In the religious component of the human journey, a "fuller 
responsible level of consciousness"36 emerges as an integral feature in the deliberation 
process. This juncture reflects Paul Tillich's basic tenet on faith: no person is without 
ultimate concern; all people consider ultimate things.37 In Lonergan 's words, these 
35 See the original preface in Lonergan, Insight, 3. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, Volume I (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951; I 973), p. 23. 
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questions and ultimate concerns reflect the inherent religious orientation of the 
individual. He writes, 
The facts of good and evil, progress and decline raise 
questions about the character of the universe. Such 
questions have been put in very many ways, and the 
answers given have been even more numerous. But behind 
this multiplicity there is a basic unity that comes to light in 
the exercise of the transcendental method. We can inquire 
into the possibility of fruitful inquiry. We can reflect on the 
nature of reflection. We can deliberate whether our 
deliberating is worthwhile. In each case, there arises the 
question of God.38 
In other words, beyond 'facts' there are 'values ' and beyond human values is a 
reachable horizon directing questions pertaining to ultimate meaning and ultimate value, 
questions that ground our authentic deliberation and action in the world. Being 'open ' to 
the ultimate source of all reason and value is what Lonergan understands as experiential 
ground of the religious component of our living.39 The deliberation process reflects the 
' long, uphill creative process' through which the metaphysical and moral state of our 
rational consciousness transcends itself to achieve rational self consciousness.40 This 
heightened level of conscious intentionality exists in the inherent religious component of 
all human subjects. Religious conversion thereby reflects the deliberation process as it 
transcends self-consciousness in the experience of"otherworldly falling in love". It goes 
beyond moral conversion by "transforming the existential subject into a subject ' held, 
38 See Lonergan, Method in Theology, p. I 0 I . 




grasped, possessed, owned through a total and so an other-worldly love' - the basis for 
all valuing, choosing and doing good."41 
2. 3. 3 Religious Orientation as 'Openness' 
Lonergan views the religious orientation and conversion in terms of openness, and 
conceptualizes openness in three different but connected ways - as fact, as achievement 
and as gift. Openness as fact is the pure desire to know, the desire to inquire into 
everything. "It is referred to by Aristotle when he speaks of the wonder that is the 
beginning of all science and philosophy .... [and] by Aquinas when he speaks of the 
natural desire to know God by his essence. "42 Openness emerges out of the inner self, and 
consciously acting or working from the inner self to affirm aspirations rooted in a desire 
for the good. Openness as fact is the foundation of openness as achievement, that which 
is "the self in its self-appropriation and self-realization".43 Openness in general, as 
Lonergan presents it, implies that the horizon of human subject goes beyond the 
exigencies of practical living and this openness is intrinsic to the human subject. But to 
have any type of openness dominate consciousness we must transform what is a principle 
of possible achievement into actual achievement, through the method of self-
appropriation. When the other worldly love is grasped and the love matures, openness as 
achievement is evident in history, actual progress in science, personal and social relations 
and scholarship. Openness as achievement is twofold - in the first instance, it is in the 
41 Braman, Brian Joseph, " The Drama of human existence," pp. iv-v 
42 Morelli and Morelli, The Lonergan Reader, p. 377. 
43 Ibid. 
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acts of understanding, when the orientation of our consciousness corresponds with the 
unrestricted desire to know. In the second instance, the object becomes "the understood" 
in the act of understanding. 
Finally, openness as gift is "an effect of grace, where grace is taken as gratis 
sanans [healing grace]".44 Openness as gift is the act of the self entering into a 
relationship with God. "Because these three are linked in the historical unfolding of the 
human spirit, they reveal how religious experience holds a fundamental place primarily in 
man's making of man .... "45 This threefold process is at the core of Lonergan's theology 
and, as well, our later discussions on faith and the dialectic of history. Human beings 
have the capacity to inquire about the ultimate meaning and value that would orientate 
and inform their practical living and spiritual pursuits. Feminism does not fall outside the 
boundaries of this task. 
2. 4 Tensions in Living: The Dialectic of the Individual 
How do these aspects of the human subject and the different facets of human 
living come together? Living is still a struggle. Asking questions and achieving openness 
are processes requiring conscious effort. Lonergan's notion of conversion seems to 
complicate the requirements of life and the operations in the human subject in a profound 
way, thereby complicating how we understand and perceive the organization of human 
living. Self-appropriation is an ongoing process; it is not an easy task. Authenticity is 
difficult to achieve and maintain. Unapologetically, Lonergan accounts for the 
44 Ibid, p. 378. 
45 Ibid. , p. 379. 
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complexity of struggle by adding yet another dimension to conscious intentionality, one 
highlighting the conscious tension of the individual human subject. 
Lonergan recognizes, that is, that while cognitional processes are preeminently 
mental, the process both begins and ends in the body. Desires, knowledge and that which 
may direct decisions and actions begin with and emerge out of a partnership with the 
bodily senses. In an Aristotelian sense, we need to eat, sleep, have sex, and indulge in 
corporeal activities. Yet, we are also rational. We have intellectual endeavors. We have 
the capacity for foresight and unconditional love. Human subjects are in the throes of 
questioning ultimate things or value, what is worthwhile. Questions such as these will 
move the subject beyond the merely corporeal. The tension Lonergan defines rests on the 
cusp of mere satisfactions, moral questions, and seeking ultimate value or religious 
grounding. We are a compound in tension. Lonergan names this dimension the dialectic 
of the human subject. 
"The self is inherently a field of tension with its own unconscious depths, with 
other selves, and with the transcendent beyond ... the relation of consciousness to the 
unconscious, to other selves, to the divine, to being."46 This dynamic renders bare the 
relationship between a lower ground oftension in human living, in which we negotiate 
the diverse and divergent demands of body and mind, and the upper ground of tension, in 
which our ultimate values exist, which spurs us to live up our moral ideals. We are 
conscious of this "religious" or "spiritual" dynamic that reveals itself in our quest for 
ultimate meaning and value. We have existential questions about the ground of our own 
46 Thomas 1. McPartland, Lonergan and the Philosophy of Historical Existence (M issouri : University of 
Missouri Press, 200 I), p. I 8 
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interests, our knowledge, and actions and that of others. Though we can differentiate 
' mind ' or 'spirit' and body, ultimately they are part of a unified whole. Human subjects 
necessarily and consciously exist as compounds in tension.47 
In a moral sense, we are suspended between the lower and upper ground and the 
tension is between being authentic and being inauthentic. Authenticity is a demand for 
creative living. With respect to personal development, it aims for self-transcendence. 
According to Lonergan, to seek an authentic self (a process that never is complete, one 
does not just become and then remain authentic) is to observe five precepts in all 
orientations, deliberations, choices, and actions: be attentive, intelligent, reasonable, 
responsible, and kind . Creative living, however, is also interpersonal and social. It is in 
the collaboration with others as well as with the earth that we create the social and 
cultural world . Thus, at the lower ground we transform the potential ities of nature in into 
intersubjective living, social structures, and cultural meanings. At the upper ground, the 
tension is between the ideal reach of desire to know and the desire to transform the world 
and our attainment. Thus, creation for a Christian or Jew is a co-creation with the creator 
of the universe or, for the Buddhist, an enlightened cooperation with karma. 
This dynamic of tension leads us to two key points. First, while the bodi ly desires 
pertain to survival and the fulfi llment of basic needs at the level of the originating desire, 
the desire to know, our innate curiosity, directs us upward toward meaning and value. 
Understanding unifies an aggregate of experience into a higher unity under the direction 
47 See, for instance, Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, translated by A.V. Miller with analysis of the te, t 
and foreword by J .N. Find lay (Oxford : C larendon Press, 1977). 
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of human deliberation. Meaning organizes us socially and culturally, informing gender 
roles and social norms. The second key point is grounded in the first: 'meaning' is itself 
subject to investigation, that is, human living and social organization are ongoing, and are 
largely based in various systems of meaning which are subject to critique. Thus, in the 
pursuit of knowledge and meaning making there is a responsibility to be attentive, 
intelligent, reasonable, responsible, and kind. Authenticity is a social expression for we 
are "not just living to survive but living in a drama in which we learn roles, develop a 
style, and express a character."48 Human beings have a responsibility to question the 
content of the character and style that orients their desires and cultures - and that of 
others. The art of living makes the human subject a part of and a contributor to, the 
world mediated by meaning. Though what constitutes human, individual, and collective 
development is not one single commodity or intelligence but rather a process of (1) self-
appropriation and (2) what we intend, or our conscious intentionality, we make our 
world. History is our product. We need to remain aware of how we make our world, and 
remain critically aware of the content and constructs we allow to move forward with us in 
history. 
2. 5 The Shifi to Interiority and History 
The construction of meaning and of history comes in stages and involves a shift to 
interiority. 
48 See Shute, OLNDJ-1, p. 23. On the drama of life which molds us, Lonergan writes in Insight, "out of the 
plasticity and exuberance of childhood through the discipline and the play of education there gradual ly is 
formed the character of' the human subject." See pp. 188-189. 
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The stages in question are ideal constructs, and the key to 
the constructing in undifferentiating and differentiation of 
consciousness. In the main we have in mind the Western 
tradition and we distinguish three stages. In the first stage 
conscious and intentional operations follow the mode of 
common sense. In a second stage besides the mode of 
common sense there is also the mode oftheory, where 
theory is controlled by logic. In a third stage the modes of 
common sense and theory remain, science asserts its 
autonomy from philosophy, and there occur philosophies 
that leave theory to science and take their stand on 
interiority.49 
This shift to interiority is central to what Lonergan calls the shift from the second 
to the third stage of meaning. It is in the shift between stages of meaning that religion 
becomes especially problematic. Initially, one could argue that ' religion' was a 
spontaneous manifestation of the human spirit in its quest of a unified knowledge and the 
expression of core meanings. This quest for ultimate meaning and value found local 
symbolic expression in art, music, dance, and ritual. 'Religion' was undifferentiated 
from other aspects of life. Just as civil societies emerged on the heels of developments in 
practical living, however, there also emerged a distinct religious aspect of life. Tribes 
had their gods and priests or shamans who were the practical specialists of that realm. 
Thus, in the first stage of meaning religious meaning finds cultural expression in symbol , 
ritual , practical magic, narrative, and myth. The emergence of the second stage of 
meaning occurs with the universalizing tendencies typified by theory. New sorts of 
questions emerge about the meeting of various religions and in response there is the 
universalizing of world religions whose domain goes beyond particular tribe and culture 
49 Lonergan, Method in Theology, p. 85 . 
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to embrace all human beings. In addition to the practical religion developed in the first 
stage of meaning, there are philosophies and theologies that differentiate human and 
divine nature. There is a clear distinction between secular and sacred realms. Eventually, 
purely secular philosophies emerge which in many cases challenge the validity of 
religions and their apologists. 
In Lonergan's view, we are currently in a period of fragmented and troubled 
consciousness characterized by the fragmentation of meaning where the relationship 
between the practical and theoretical, sacred and secular is problematic. 50 Efforts to 
integrate the religious and secular components of human living are fraught with the kinds 
of difficulties that emerged in the Hampson-Ruether debate. The very effor1 to introduce 
religious meaning into the debate is itself questioned. Sorting out differences will not be 
an easy process. As I hope to show, however, Lonergan ' s dialectic of history wi ll be a 
key element in this aim. 
2.6 Summary 
We have explored the heightened consciousness in relation to what Lonergan 
means by the basic religious orientation of the human subject and how the notions arising 
out of the religious orientation, namely self-transcendence and authenticity, inform moral 
decision-making. Lonergan's notion of self-appropriation fundamenta lly grounds his 
basic positions on knowing, objectivity, and being, and these positions in turn inform his 
notion of the dialectic of history. We have considered a spontaneous emergence of the 
50 Lonergan, Method in Theology, p. 84. 
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religious question in human beings that does not require averting the question of bias and 
evil in the world. 
It is clear that Lonergan's social philosophy is not a simple confluence of material 
and phenomenon. Rather, his understanding of the dialectic considers authenticity, the 
religious dynamic, or the transcendental precepts or the potential for divine 
transcendence, as a guiding force in history. In the following chapter, we will examine 
how the notions ofbeliefand inherited values are fundamental to Lonergan' s method. We 
will explore in what ways the dialectic of history involves the dynamics of fee lings and 
inner symbolic worlds, the workings of bias, the rejection oftrue value in favor of mere 
satisfaction, and the commitment to love rather than hate, and show how the individual 
dialectic becomes a social dialectic. To these tasks we now turn. 
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Chapter 3: The Human Good and the Dialectic of History 
In the 1930's Lonergan developed his notion ofthe dialectic of history as a 
Catholic response to the dominant secular philosophies of history, specifically liberalism 
and Marxism. 1 In his view, the problem with liberalism was rooted in its assumption that 
reason was strictly individual and its view that progress was automatic. While liberalism 
trumpeted individual liberty, it failed to take into account the reality of the reign of sin 
and had no notion of social order other than the Realpolitik of the balance of power or 
balance of special interests. Marxism countered liberalism's simple-minded 
individualism with a totalitarian conception of social order yet gained order at the 
expense of human liberty. 
Lonergan sought a viewpoint that included both real liberty and real order. This 
he found in the Catholic theology of the Mystical Body. His strategy was to counter the 
alienation of secular ideologies of history with the fact of the mystical body of Christ. In 
Lonergan's view, both liberalism and Marxism failed to realize the positive role of 
authentic religious faith in history. Authentic religious faith and its expression in human 
hope and effective charity reverses decline.2 Despite the ultimately theological context of 
Lonergan' s understanding ofhuman history, he develops a theory of the dialectic of 
1 For an overview see Frederick Lawrence, " Lonergan As Political Theologian ," in Religion in Context, 
ed. Timothy P. Fallon, S.J., & Philip Boo Riley, (Lanham, Md: University Press of America, 1988), pp. 1-
22, Hugo Meynell, "Values in Social Science: Foundations and Applications," in Religion in Context, ed. 
Timothy P. Fallon, S.J., & Philip Boo Riley, (Lanham, Md: University Press of America, 1988), pp. 23-4; 
Thomas McPartland, "Historicity and Philosophy: The Event of Philosophy: Past Present and Future," in 
Religion in Context, ed. Timothy P. Fallon, S.J ., & Philip Boo Riley, (Lanham, Md: University Press of 
America, 1988), pp. 87-11 2. 
2 On major and minor authenticity, see Lonergan, Method in Theology (New York: The Seabury Press, 
1972), p. 80. 
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history that was in his view strictly philosophical.3 Relying on Aquinas's methodological 
differentiation of philosophy and theology, Lonergan maintained a strict differentiation of 
the theological and philosophical components in his understanding of the dialectic of 
history,4 the theological component handled in a theology of the Mystical Body and the 
philosophical component handled by his notion of the dialectic of history. He developed 
his account of the dialectic of history based on Aquinas' account of human reason and 
free will, and extended that account to the question of human history. Progress is the 
ideal line of human reason effectively translated into effective action. Decline is a 
consequence of the fai lure of human freedom to follow the dictates of reason. Finally, 
renaissance is the reversal of decline through the actual influence in history of acts of 
faith, hope, and charity by those who have freely chosen to counter hate with acts of love 
and forgiveness. 
Lonergan conceives his dialectical philosophy using a scissors analogy. The upper 
blade is the theoretical framework while the lower blade is the flow or course of history. 
Understanding history is an act of understanding the relationship between the two blades 
of the scissors. Lonergan derives the heuristic structure of the upper blade from three 
fundamental differentials and their dialectical relationships. First, there is the effect of 
authentic thought and action on the flow of the material. Second, there is the adjustment 
to the first differential due to unauthentic activity. Third, there is the projection of what is 
3 See Bernard Lonergan "Analytic Concept of History" in Frederick E. Crowe, ed. Method: Journal of 
Lonergan Studies II: I (1993), pp. 1-36. 
4 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, 1-la QQ I, a I . 
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required to restore the flow of history to its natural process through supernatural acts of 
grace. 5 
The upper blade is a three-fold approximation to the actual course or flow of 
history. "Progress" imagines what history would be like if in every instance human 
beings always followed the transcendental precepts. In his account of progress, Lonergan 
includes a theory of the stages of ideal progress in history. These eventually become the 
stages of meaning in Method in Theology.6 The second approximation, known as 
'decline', includes the effects of inauthentic thought and action and its cumulative 
consequences. The third element is renaissance or, speaking theologically, redemption. 
"The third approximation results from asking how the historical situation that results 
from both authentic and unauthentic actions can be returned to conformity to a life 
according to the exigencies ofprogress."7 It is through this third approximation that 
religion makes its entrance. 
Our aims in this chapter are to expand our account of self-appropriation to include 
more explicitly its social and cultural components, and to flesh out the dynamics inherent 
in the above description of the upper blade of the dialectic of history in terms of the good. 
We can then speak of dialectic of community and, ultimately, both blades of the dialectic 
ofhistory. The first section ofthis chapter introduces the 'Structure of the Human Good. ' 
This structure provides the heuristic model or ideal type for the analysis of social 
questions and thereby sets up the normative context for Lonergan's notion of ' bias,' a 
5 See Shute, OLNDH, pp. 40-44. It is Lonergan 's contention that the scientific approach to general history 
has to be of the same type as the specialized history. 
6 Lonergan, Method in Theology, pp. 85-86. 
7 Shute, OLNDH, p. 42. Also see, Lonergan, Method in Theology. 
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notion central to the argument of the thesis. The second section then situated bias in the 
context of the first two elements of the dialectic of history, progress and decline. We 
begin, then, with a sketch of the Structure of the Human Good as mapped out in the 
diagram below. 
3.1 The Structure ofthe Human Goocf 
Individual Operations Community Dimension Meanings of "good" 
I) Desires, Needs Cooperation Pat1icular goods 
2) Habits, ski ll s Institution, set up, tasks Good of Order 
3) Orientation/transformations Personal relations Terminal Value 
The 'Structure of the Human Good' is one component of the upper blade of the 
dialectic of history. It is an ideal structure, providing fundamental terms and relations for 
investigating the capacities of human community for progress. The structure per se does 
not include the categories of decline and redemption: its terms and relationships assume 
the normative operation of human needs and capacities. Nonetheless, it can be readily 
adapted to do so, as Lonergan himself does in his account of the good in Topics of 
Education.9 The structure is a foundational context for the study of social systems, it is a 
' fundamental sociology' with an invariant structure and thereby relevant for the study of 
all cultures in any stage of development. Conceived in consort with the notion of the 
dialectic of history, it envisages the "individual and the social components of the good 
[as] the range and flexibility of the structure [allows] for exploring all classes of human 
8 The diagram is a version adapted from the one that appears in Lonergan, Method in Theology, p. 48. 
9 Lonergan, Topics in Education in Collection, Vol. 10, chapter 2-4, especially pp. 58-78. 
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action and the conditions of their operation." 10 Lonergan's fundamental aim in 
developing the structure ofthe good was to provide a theoretical structure that might 
"advance human liberty." 11 He wanted to show that, "there is much greater flexibility in 
the human psyche that makes it open to and adaptable to the emergence of higher forms 
of organization or self-assembly." 12 Let us examine the first line of the structure. 
3.1.1 The First Line of the Human Good 
The first line of structure of the human good assumes that human beings can 
operate collectively and that they typically organize acts of cooperation around collective 
desires and particular goods. The assumption that the human species has normative 
capacity for cooperation is crucial to Lonergan's argument. It is an assumption about the 
nature of the species that challenges assumptions of liberal and Marxist views of social 
organization. Liberal social contract theories, whether originating from Hobbes, Locke 
or Rousseau, all start with a methodological individualism. In each case, theories of 
human cooperation are founded on some primeval agreement among individuals. 
Lonergan's view is that the human species is, by its nature, cooperative. 13 Marxists, for 
their part, argue that, while groups coalesce around common class interests, class conflict 
is nonetheless the fundamental drive in human history. As we shall see, Lonergan does 
10 See Shute, OLNDH, p. 265 . 
II Ibid. 
12 Lonergan, Method in Theology, p. 42. 
13 There is increasing body of evidence to support this view from the research of primate zoologists. For 
two among many recent examples see Frans De Waal Our Inner Ape (NY: Riverhead Books, 2005) and 
Dorothy L. Cheney & Robert M. Seyfarth, Baboon Metaphysics: The Evolution of a Social Mind (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2008). 
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not deny the reality of human conflict but he sees it as a distortion of a basic human 
capacity for intelligent cooperation. 
Basic to the flow of the social order is the identification of collective needs and 
desires. Human beings ask: which particular ends or goods are desired or required to 
satisfy basic needs of our community at this time? We can use Maslow's hierarchy of 
needs to illustrate how cooperation unfolds on multiple levels, one flowing to the other in 
a given order. From the bottom up, we have physiological needs, such as clean air, food, 
water, and sleep. Above the basic needs is the need for security and safety, for instance, 
whereby food security, protection from enemies, or shelter takes precedence. Thus, the 
capacity for performance fTom the structure's first line illustrates that biological, 
physiological needs or desires for security direct particular ends. But ends can also reflect 
the broadest wants, such as the need for belonging and love, cognitive needs or the need 
to wonder or to know, transcendent needs or the need to believe, and aesthetic desires. 
The capacity to cooperate is also a capacity to develop higher social orders, self-
understanding, meaning and tradition. 
The key distinction to grasp here is that between 'recurrent needs" and 'capacities 
to develop' . Both are incipient in human beings. 'Needs ' have their origin in our biology 
and as so with other primates, we have needs for sustenance, reproduction, security and 
so on. The occurrence of needs repeats itself: our need for food and water reoccurs daily. 
Typically, needs are met in a cooperative nexus with others. This is most obvious in 
infants who are completely dependent on the care of parents, but any reflection on how 
we satisfy basic needs reveals a supporting social structure. 
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Human history reveals how human beings develop new ways to meet needs and to 
organize their recurrent fulfillment, illustrating that the native intelligence of human 
beings is eminently creative. This capacity for practical intelligence allows us to organize 
the meeting of needs in a more efficient manner that our primate cousins. Baboons 
cooperate in food-gathering, but they do not invent baskets to make the task more 
efficient. It seems that human beings also have a further set of capacities, beyond the 
reach of primates. For example, while both baboons and human beings have a capacity 
for play, only human beings develop sport, and while baboon may pause to enjoy taste 
and smells, human beings develop cuisine. 
3.1.2 The Second Line of the Human Good 
Whatever our particular ends, they are organized by the terms of the second line, 
which organises the habits, skills and development of individuals, and groups of 
individuals in the community. For instance, we not only eat, we eat together at dinner in a 
family. It involves preparation of the food and rules of behaviour for eating and talking. It 
requires an economic system which organises the provision of particular goods in some 
commonly understood way. By adhering to the commonly understood and accepted roles 
and tasks, whether in the private sphere like the home or the public domain such as 
school, industry and commerce, in politics and finance, in church and state the 
community develops "a vast and intricate web of interconnections that set the lines along 
which cooperation occurs and uncooperativeness is sanctioned." 14 The agreed upon 
14 Lonergan, Method in Theology, p. 48. 
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particular goods and the degree of cooperativeness inform the ends to which the 
functioning of the institutions operates. The institution can be the family, society and law, 
church, school, and the economy. These institutional frameworks "constitute the 
commonly understood and already accepted basis and mode of cooperation. They tend to 
change only slowly for change, as distinct from breakdown, involves a new common 
understanding and a new common consent." 15 This process of change, or how a 
community adapts to change and potentially evolves, is integral to the community itself 
and not only informs but is integral to sustaining the good of order. 
3.1. 2.1 The Good of Order 
Cooperation ensures the functioning of the social matrix, and "this concrete 
manner, in which cooperation is working out, is what is meant by the good of order." 16 
The good of order is the proper goal of the second line of the structure of the good. Its 
integrity depends upon the underlying operation of the terms of the first lines: without 
needs, there is no need to order them; without capacities, there is no way to order them. 
In a technical sense, the good of order maintains the flow of particular goods via the 
operation of insight, skills, and habits ofthe individuals in the community. This flow 
further constitutes the group needs and capacities, and such collective desires and needs 
put pressure on the set up of social order and institutions to meet collective demands. 
Institutions in turn shape the various capacities, skills, development, and operations of the 
individual s and the community. Institutions guarantee the flow of particular goods, and 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid., p. 49. 
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sustain the insights, habits, feelings, and skills required to sustain collective agreement 
and basic needs of the community. This process is a "development of practical 
intelligence" which ensures the continued functioning of the infrastructure and the 
institutions. This intelligence is manifest in the common sense of the community that 
binds "all its participants into a recognizable, cooperating social order." 17 
If we recall , human knowing involves judgments about the reali ty of the present 
situation and the deliberation on the value of possible courses of action. In communities, 
the individual capacity for intelligence becomes a collective achievement apparent in the 
varieties of common sense and belief systems that sustain social systems and their 
institutions. A way of life, with its common fund of beliefs, ensures the spontaneous 
cooperation of citizens. The notion that there are " ideas" which can mobilize and 
organize masses of people into cooperation is illustrative of the historical production of 
meaning, the stages of meaning and the concrete functioning of belief. Collective actions 
occur in the context of common sense and a social order that provides the stability 
required for a well functioning society. What Lonergan means by the good of order, then, 
is essentially a 'scheme ofrecurrence' , one that grounds the conditions of "the concrete 
functioning of human cooperation to bring about a sustained succession of particular 
goods." 18 This dynamic function produces a routine and a particular good of order on 
which all societies are dependent. As summarized by Michael McLaughlin: 
A great deal of what happens in ordinary social life, the 
organization of work, the cooperation of industries with 
each other, the basics of investment and capital formation, 
17 Dunne, Lonergan and Spirituality, p.86. 
18 See Lonergan, Method in Theology, pp. 27-56. 
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the laws which regulate buying and selling, the polity 
which regulates economics based on social consensus, can 
be understood on the level of common sense. The network 
of actions and relationships required to get things done in 
an orderly and predictable way is what Lonergan refers to 
as a 'scheme ofrecurrence'. 19 
The sustained developments in civilizations therefore function like a wheel, and this 
wheel can turn indefinitely. Still, new ideas are required to meet challenges to the 
established schemes of the social structure. Such established schemes of recurrence are 
the collective habits that must adapt to new situations. Thus, as it pertains to both the 
scheme of recurrence and the operative dynamics of the human subject, the wheel I have 
in mind can be laid out as follows: situation, insight, counsel, policy, common consent, 
action, new situation, new insight, new counsel, new policy, and so on.20 As we shall see, 
adaptation is the fundamental dynamic of human progress that constitutes the first 
element of Lonergan's notion ofthe dialectic of history. 
3.1.2.2 Culture and Values 
Though we may not aver them explicitly, the structural invariants of particular 
goods, the good of order, and values are constantly operative in our lives. Culture or 
' meaning' is obviously intrinsically tied to intellectual development - particular goods 
and the good of order - as values and value-based systems are the foundation of 
community and social development. We may argue that, though the development of a 
19 See McLaughlin, Michael T., Knowledge, Consciousness and Religious Conversion in Lonergan and 
Aurobino (Roma: Editrice Pontica: Universita Gregorianna, 2003) p. 31. 
20 See Lonergan, Topics in Education , pp. 49-51. 
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civilization rests in human collaboration and practical living, the enjoyment of that social 
order rests in the capacity for intersubjective cooperation - the capacity to organize 
systems intelligently, or to make judgments of value with respect to the possible systems 
we might envisage. As previously noted, the capacity to cooperate according to higher 
demands is also a capacity to develop higher social orders, self-understanding, meaning, 
and tradition. Our capacity for meaning and value moves our collective living beyond 
the practical into the realm of culture. Culture is a capacity to choose a social order based 
on a scale of values. 
There is the expansion of social meanings in the evolution 
of domestic, economic, and political arrangements. There is 
the expansion of cultural meanings as people reflect on 
their work, their interpersonal relationships, and the 
meanings of human life.21 
The meaning of life and the shift to interiority grounds self-appropriation or 
collective-appropriation, if you will. Self-appropriation includes being aware of "the 
spontaneity [that] is rooted in the existential moods of wonder (as we inquire), doubt (as 
we reflect) and dread (as we deliberate)." The intentionality grounded in the cognitional 
structure and the structure of choice provides the potential for moral living grounded in 
the transcendental precepts.22 "Responsible decision-making requires the consideration of 
alternatives, possibilities, proper assessment of our concerns and feelings, and 
21 See Morelli and Morelli , The Lonergan Reader, p. 599. 
22 T he structure of choice, and choice itself, is the link between human livi ng and the dialectical dynamics 
operative in human history. See Lonergan, Insight, p. 224 and p. 599. See also Immanuel Kant, 
Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, 3d. Ed., trans. H.J. Paton (New York: Harper and Row, 1964); 
Giovanni Sala, "The A Priori in Human Knowledge: Kant's Critique of Pure Reason and Lonergan 's 
Ins ight," Thomist 40 ( 1976): pp. 179-221 . 
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commitment to responsible courses of action. "23 The religious component of the human 
subject is active in the heightened consciousness achieved in self-appropriation, the mode 
whereby we not only know but also know about knowing. In the same sense, we could 
speak of achieving a heightened conscience in which one not only deliberates, but also 
knows how one deliberates. This implies a collective shift to interiority. Lonergan 
distinguished this higher level from that of the basic social order because it is through 
culture and personal relations that the conditions of human cooperation and social order, 
in the first two lines are fulfilled in a way of lije?4 The following section examines the 
third line in the structure of the human good. 
3.1. 3 The Third Line of the Human Good 
The third level adds another dimension to cultural structures, namely that the 
fundamental capacity for cooperation and the social order are conditions of the higher 
goal of authentic culture. While authenticity and culture do not add new data, they 
supplement the structure with a higher context for understanding the data. In this further 
context, civilizations are more than social orders; they are a shared cultural matrix that 
extends beyond particular political or economic units to a set of shared values reflected in 
the fundamental orientation of individuals and the character of their personal relations. 
To illustrate, let us return to Maslow's theory of human motivation. As we illustrated in 
the beginning of the chapter, the principles of practical living meet basic needs such as 
23 Shute, OLNDH, p. 17. 
24 Also differentiated as dialectic of fact ( intelligence) and dialectic of theory (reflection). 
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the physiological and need for safety. These needs are organized within a good of order 
that ensures that needs are met continuously for the majority of people. Social programs 
supplement the needs of the marginalized populations. To a degree, operations on the 
first two levels serve also to meet social needs, esteem, and self-actualization. The third 
line represents what Maslow named toward the end of his life, the need for self-
transcendence or self-actualization. For Lonergan, this need is for a self-appropriated 
authenticity based in terminal values at the level of personal relations. The third line 
functions as the context for the affirmation or criticism of everything amassed from the 
development during the first two lines. The third line provides the space that allows the 
judgment of values that originate a community and direct human cooperation for 
particular goods. 
For Lonergan, reflective development differentiates practical living with an 
orientation toward the making of meaning. The third line allows for a further expansion 
of the collective horizon, one that moves the community into the religious orientation of 
living, or interiority, and encourages transcendence, advanced creativity and critical 
thinking. Whereas the first two lines ask what we need, here we ask why we need it. To 
that end, terminal values demand that we discuss as a collective what is worthwhile; these 
questions in turn form the backbone of that which constitutes culture, social and 
individual responsibility. They give direction to the personal and particular goods and 
ends. 
In summary, terminal values are the foundation of pragmatic action, 
policymaking, personal and collective development and the notion of ' solidarity' . Thus, 
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the particular goals of the third line "give purpose to insight and render us more than 
mere machines. Only a regular obedience to the transcendental precepts by each member 
of a community can successfully direct brilliant insights toward worthwhile ends."25 The 
structure of the good further demonstrates how human subjects are compounds-in-
tension, though this time within multiple levels of community. 
3.2 A Notion ofCommunity 
The processes and aspirations of the human subject do not occur in isolation; 
indeed, they happen with other human beings in communities. The past and present are 
the cumulative result of human decisions and actions, both individual and collaborative, 
for what humans do and say enters into the flow of history. As we have seen, Lonergan 
organizes the human good on three levels according to the ends or goals pursued: 
particular goods, the good of order and terminal value.26 Accordingly, Lonergan 
distinguishes " three levels of community [that] follow from the three components of 
knowing and of the good.',n 
3. 2. 1 Levels of Community 
Corresponding to knowing and the cognitive level of experience, the first level of 
community is intersubjective. Intersubjective community is manifest in the elemental 
feeling of belonging together, the nucleus being the family unit and its expansion "the 
25 Dunne, Lonergan and Spirituality ,p. 88; See Lonergan, Topics in Education, pp. 55-57. 
26 Lonergan, Insight, Chapter 18. 
27 Lonergan, " Role of Catholic University in the Modern World" in Collection, Vol. 4, ed. F.E. Crowe 
(Toronto: University ofToronto, 1993), p. 109. 
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clan, the tribe, the nation."28 While intersubjective community precedes civilization, it 
also "underpins it, so also it remains when civilization suffers disintegration and 
decay. "29 Its basis is the spontaneous tendency of human beings to cooperate in the 
pursuit of particular goods. 30 
Corresponding to the cognitional level of understanding, the second level of 
community is civil community. It is the social institutions, including economic and 
political structures devised to organize human cooperation for particular goods. Lastly, 
corresponding to the cognitive level of judgment is cultural community, which Lonergan 
understands to be, "the field of communication and influence of artists, scientists, and 
philosophers .... "31 It is in the cultural matrix within which persons consent and advance 
shared meanings and values. Culture establishes the preferred order of values in a 
community. These three levels organize the satisfactions of individual needs and the 
development of personal capacities within the context of social order, and cultural 
meanings and values. These three levels are in tune with the levels of degrees of 
differentiation of consciousness. 
3. 2. 2 Dialectic of Community 
The communities and social spaces created by human acts inform the 
environment that we all subsequently process in our inquiries and deliberations, and form 
our lived experiences. Shared lived situations necessarily create solidarity among persons 
28 Ibid. 




in a community and thus the social environment is fundamentally interpersonal. Just as 
there is a dialectic of the subject there is a dialectic of community. The dialectic of 
community is a permanent tension in human living and it is the development-in-tension 
ofthe human subject writ large. 
We will recall that the dialectic of the human subject is a conscious tension in 
which the subject negotiates between neural demands and practical intelligence, between 
material pursuits and sensory perceptions, between the determinations of the human 
subject and the demands of the community, and finally between the secular and the 
sacred.32 "Accordingly, one might say that a single dialectic of community is related to a 
manifold of individual sets of neural demand functions through a manifold of individual 
dialectics."33 The dialectic of the individual is therefore similar to the dialectic of 
community. Yet, Lonergan writes, 
In two manners, this dialectic of community differs from 
the dialectic of community of the dramatic subject. First, 
there is a difference in extent, for the dialectic of 
community regards the history of human relationships, 
while the inner dialectic of the subject regards the 
biography of the individual. Secondly, there is the 
difference in the level of activity, for the dialectic of 
community is concerned with the interplay of more or less 
conscious intelligence and more or less conscious 
spontaneity in the aggregate of individuals, while the 
dialectic of the subject is concerned with the entry of neural 
demands into consciousness.34 
32 Kantian ethics, Hegelian metaphysics, and Marxist social philosophy all inform these specific roots of 
contemporary dialectical theory and, though the cultural contexts of each aspired to various degrees of 
'idealism', fundamental to all were epistemological and dialectical foundations of the human subject. 
33 Lonergan, Insight, p. 243. 
34 Lonergan, "The Role ofthe Catholic University in the Modern World," in Collection, Vo/.4, p. 109. 
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Just as the moral quest of the individual leads to self-transcendence, this dialectical 
relationship takes a community beyond the horizon of "means of production" to that of 
ends and values - why are we doing what we are doing. The operations inherent within 
this tension are fundamental to progress and emancipation from all that does not work to 
the full of humanity. The dialectic of community is thereby concomitant with modes of 
cooperation, belief systems, capacity building, choice and free will.35 
3. 3 A Notion of History 
The dialectic of history connects intricately to the structure of the good, and both 
are an expansion ofLonergan's cognitional theory. As we have noted, the structure of the 
good is an ideal type for understanding the structure of human development. The dialectic 
of history is a key tool in understanding human development and decline in history. As a 
dynamic structure, the dialectic of history connects the structure of the good to the flow 
of history. While individual development is a matter of personal authenticity, the 
structure of the good is a matter of the degree of authenticity in personal relations. The 
tension experienced by individual human subjects is thereby writ large in the community 
and in history. We can thereby speak of the dialectic of history. Lonergan characterizes 
the dialectic of history as "the concrete, the dynamic, and the contradictory. "36 
Accordingly, the roots of the dialectic constitute the basic tension of human living, and 
therefore the self-appropriation of the human subject, especially the subject's inner 
dialectical tensions. The following section forms the foundation for the main argument of 
35 Lonergan, Method in Theology, p. 48. 
36 Lonergan, A Third Collection, p. 7. 
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the thesis, and examines the first two approximations of Lonergan's dialectic ofhistory: 
progress and decline. 
3. 3.1 Dialectic of History: Progress 
As noted, there are three categories in Lonergan's account of the dialectic of 
history and these categories are of a most general nature. Each category is an 
approximation of what is actually going on. The first category, progress is a projection of 
what human history would be if human beings always acted intelligently, reasonably and 
responsibly. In this sense, progress is counterfactual history; it sets up an ideal course 
from which any actual course typically deviates. We might ask, for example, what might 
the state of the Newfoundland Cod fishery be if all the relevant actors in its history had 
exercised due diligence in the management of the fishery? This exercise in counterfactual 
history allows us to project what might have been the case and, as an imaginative 
exercise, identifies a potential set of authentic actions that may well have informed some 
courses of action in the history ofthe Cod Fishery. Alternatively, to take an example 
closer to our thesis topic: what might the history of Christianity or Catholic Church be if 
gender bias was recognized and addressed from the very beginning? What would such an 
authentic collaboration look like? How would it affect the history of Christianity and the 
aim offeminist theologians? 
Certainly, the course of history seldom, if ever, takes an ideal path. Still, history 
nonetheless includes authentic efforts to meet problems with solutions that work. This is 
the heart of human creativity. By projecting this counter-factual history of progress, we 
identify the authentically creative responses that have occurred. Furthermore, knowing 
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the ideal line of progress makes it possible to recognize more clearly, where things went 
wrong. We recognize gender bias because we have a real notion of just social relations. 
Without a notion of just gender relations, we may not recognize the bias or the 
permeating structure of patriarchy within society. 
3.3.2 Dialectic of History: Decline 
If progress projects an ideal scenario that assumes the full use of human 
potentialities, decline is the result of a failure to develop human capacities. To put 
another way, progress seeks out the authentic in history and decline identifies what is 
inauthentic. 
This wheel of progress becomes a wheel of decline when 
the process is distorted by bias. Increasingly the situation 
becomes, not the cumulative product of coherent and 
complementary insights, but the dump in which are heaped 
the amorphous and incompatible products of the biases of 
self-centered and short-sighted individuals and groups. 
Finally, the core of the objective situation becomes a mere 
dump, the less is there any possibility of human intelligence 
gathering from the situation anything more than a lengthy 
catalogue ofthe aberrations and the follies of the past. As a 
diagnosis of terminal cancer denies any prospect of health 
restored, so a social dump is the end of fruitful insight and 
of the cumulative development it can generate.37 
The brilliance of decline rests in its deceptiveness: corrupt ideologies can be mistaken as 
progressive ideas; that is, particular visions, commodities, or ends for which the good of 
order is functioning may not be good but may appear to be so. The operations of those in 
power or those who have authority may or may not be authentic. The values at the 
37 Lonergan, "Healing and Creating in History," A Third Collection, p. I 05 
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summit of the cooperative operations and intentions for particular goods may or may not 
be consistent with the transcendental precepts. As discerned, power could be naked, 
ultimately revealing power as mere power. In this context, Lonergan distinguishes four 
types of bias: dramatic, individual, group, or general bias. We should note that the root of 
all bias is the failure of individuals to observe the transcendental precepts, or the moral 
quest. 
Dramatic bias occurs when a lack of requisite insights enter into a concrete 
si tuation. There is first a compensation for the ~ore demanding adaptations which 
intelligence would suggest and, secondly, an incorrect assessment of specific situations.38 
Dramatic bias is therefore a disruption in the occurrence of insights that are a normal, 
recurrent, occurrence in a dramatic subject. Lonergan identifies dramatic bias with the 
psychological phenomena of scotosis, a blind spot in the subject that prevents insights 
from occurring. It is an aberration and because the repression is pre-conscious, it distorts 
the development of the subject on both personal and sociallevels.39 Elements of dramatic 
bias are illustrated in Nietzsche's or Keirkegaard 's notion of ressentiment, namely the 
dislocation of one's feelings of anger, inferiority, and failure or compulsive use of a 
scapegoat. The human subject posits all fai lures and faults onto an illusionary enemy, as 
they themselves could not possibly be responsible for their demise or circumstances.40 
38 Dunne, Lonergan and Spirituality, p. 95. 
39 Shute, OLNDH, 45. Lonergan also calls this "scotosis". See lnsighl, 191 -206. See also Robert Doran, 
Psychic Conversion and Theological Foundalions: Toward a Reorientalion of the Human Sciences 
(Cali fom ia: Scho Iars Press, 1981 ). 
40 See Neitzsche, Frederick, On The Genealogy of Morals and Ecce Homo, translated and edited by Walter 
Kaufmann (translation of On the Genealogy in collaboration with R. J. Hollingdale) (New York: Vintage, 
1967); this version also included in Basic Writings a/Nietzsche (New York: Modern Library); See 
Kierkegaard, Seren. A Literaty Review (Penguin Classics, 200 I). 
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The result of this is an explicit protective system that surrounds every operation and 
every mannerism, as if the individual is obedient to some inner law.41 "Friends, family, 
co-workers, the general public, may be aware of the rigidness or compulsiveness of the 
individual in question and so, in turn, create routines of their own which act as defensive 
circles against the effect of the bias." 42 As Dunne notes, everybody is convinced that 
these adaptations are necessary but nobody understands why. 
Because the bias occurs in the dramatic pattern [of 
existence] it affects the communication of particular needs 
and desires and consequently it affects the artistry required 
for the successful performance of tasks. Dramatic bias 
constitutes a weakening of development of common sense 
and, accordingly, it affects the flow of acts that would 
recognize and promote successfully the human cooperation 
that produces the good of order.43 
Such aberration on the individual level becomes more severe on the social level. 
The second type of bias is egoism. Like neurotics, egoists disrupt the flow of cooperation, 
which is necessary for social living. They consciously intend to exploit the intelligence 
and intersubjective feelings of others, as well as the situation or the good of order in both 
personal and public spheres, for their own ends. They exercise the detached practical 
intelligence necessary for progress, yet their intelligence is incomplete and inauthentic, 
driven by various fears and desires. The egoist does not consider the consequences of 
what they do to others in the situation. For them the social order is there to assist them in 
meeting their needs; they do grasp the responsibilities that they might have for the group 
41 Dunne, Lonergan and Spirituality, p. 95. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Shute, OLNDH, p. 45. See Lonergan, Insight, p. 191-222. 
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or for the institutions. This not only disrupts the good of order, but it distorts the tension 
between intersubjective spontaneity and practical intelligence that is an essential part of 
that order. The greater the distortion, the more difficult it is for the community to 
counteract the detrimental effect. Moreover, though the law may handle incidental 
aberrations, when egoism becomes generally prevalent there is bound to be deterioration 
in the effective operation of the good of order.44 
Like individual bias, group bias or group egoism is also largely an effect of 
intersubjective fee lings based in self-interest.45 Just as the egoist may be a ' dried up well ' 
when the community needs insight into the common good, when a group is operating 
solely in their own interests, it is difficult to marshal the insights needed to meet political, 
economic and social problems.46 These groups consciously suppress insights into what 
may be best for outsiders of the group. Group bias is the welcoming nest for neurotics 
and egoists and destructive to the good of order in many ways. 
Obviously, a common understanding binds a community together, and can 
encourage responsible adaptation to new situations, that maintains the good of order.47 
However, group bias distorts the effort to adapt so that only those ideas that function to 
sustain their own ends emerge. Just as the egoist is not interested in acquiring the insight 
needed to understand the situation of others, so group bias prevents insight into the 
genuine needs of other groups. While they may be unaware of the detrimental effect, the 
44 See Shute, OLNDH, p. 46. 
45 See Lonergan, Insight, pp. 222-225. 
46 Dunne, Lonergan and Spirituality, p. 97. 
47 As noted, the development of a social order depends upon the cycle of successive new ideas and the 
successive adaptation within social groups. See Shute, OLNDH, p. 46. 
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group alters the social schema with ideas that are not fruitful for all, or operative and 
advantageous only for some, namely themselves and those of like mind.48 
In turn, there is a succession of unconscious oppression and molding of attitudes 
of the oppressed groups and the sustaining of the elite groups and power. 
Advantaged groups develop ideologies to rationalize their 
controlling position in the social order and so become blind 
to the real situation that needs correction. Only some of the 
ideas necessary for development are put in place. The 
advantaged group directs the distribution of goods to its 
own advantage at the expense of the less advantaged. 
Necessary correctives are deemed impractical; because the 
development is one-sided disadvantaged groups plot their 
revenge. The degree or distortion will condition the 
character of their challenge. 49 
The dominant group, just as any group, may have been creative and perhaps visionary, 
but bias may lead them to disregard the insights emerging from oppressed groups. To 
protect their status, remain in power, and maintain the flow of their ideas as operative 
insights, the concerns of the other groups are consciously blocked and overlooked. Put 
into practice are manipulated economies, fragile and directed technologies, biased beliefs 
and morals, military forces whose sole purpose is to protect the dominant group, and the 
manipulation of other creative groups. 50 This leads into the last type of bias: general bias. 
General bias is the failure to avert to questions and concerns that go beyond the 
practical. The form of intelligence proper for dealing with the practical world is common 
48 Herein, for instance, is the source of class and gender distinctions based not simply on the division of 
labour but upon privileged social status. We will examine this further in the next chapter. 
49 Shute, OLNDH, pp. 47-49. Lonergan writes in Insight "[T]o a great extent the attitude of the dominant 
group determines the attitude of depressed groups. Revolutionaries oppress reactionaries . Liberals meet 
progressives. In the former case the situation heads toward violence. In the latter case, there is a genera l 
agreement about ends with disagreement about the pace of change and the mode and measure of its 
execution." See also Lonergan, Insight, p. 225. 
50 Dunne, Lonergan and Spirituality, pp. 97-100. 
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sense. It is necessary for the healthy functioning of the social order, but common sense 
by its very nature is shortsighted; it is only concerned with fixing the immediate situation. 
It curtails the occurrence of those further insights or questions that have no practical 
bearing on the situation at hand. However, the assumption that common sense is omni-
competent is detrimental to long term planning. It is the anti-intellectual stance. Of 
course, it gets things done, but it does not have much interest in the world of theory. 
Common sense systematically ignores it. It adheres to the notion that to think long-term 
is to be impractical for deliberation on long-term goals or fundamental values is 
irrelevant to fixing the immediate problem. 51 
Lonergan writes, "Just as technical, economic, and political development gives 
man a dominion over nature, so the advance of knowledge creates and demands a human 
contribution to the control of human history."52 However, common sense does not allow 
one to think on the level of history as it arrests the demands of the moral quest, namely a 
reach for higher viewpoints, authenticity, and the discernment of true value. Those 
operating from general bias therefore become blind to their own limitations. Ultimately, 
common sense is anti-religious. Reducing religious practice to the practical horizon of 
common sense dwarfs and stunts the religious orientation of the human subject. It cuts off 
the deeper reaches of the religious quest that seeks to understand the ultimate meaning of 
life. Common sense does not let one appreciate the need for philosophy critical theory, 
or the study of history; it does not understand the mystics desire to withdraw to a life of 
51 Lonergan, Insight, pp. 225-38. 
52 Ibid., p. 227. 
82 
prayer. In short, common sense does not have the drive and the norms for understanding 
profoundly complex problems, hence the need for a third line of the structure. 53 
In summary, bias compromises the balance between common sense and theory, or 
the religious component in human living, with dire consequences. When the short-term 
view prevails, bias and decline are inevitable; the transcendence and emergence ofhigher 
viewpoints requires not only a long-term view but also thinking on the level of history, 
for it is these two practices that guide progress. Due to bias, especially group and general 
bias, groups are marginalized, relevant questions are dismissed because they are 
considered non-practical, resulting in oversights and a flight from understanding. The 
higher viewpoint is unattained and specializations of human intelligence are unaddressed. 
Thus, a cumulative succession of increasingly restricted situations in which human kind 
relinquished intelligent, rational, and responsible control over the course of history 
proceeds. 
3. 3. 2.1 Authority and Power 
Lonergan ignores neither individual autonomy nor the fact of social conflict, but 
he emphasizes that the act of cooperation with intellectual and effective development is 
normative. That is, social conflict does not occur because the act of cooperation itself is 
flawed. Rather, conflict is a feature of the tension between the routines of a present order 
and the innovations that would alter it; it is manifest in the competing interests of various 
groups, and in the incomplete development of individuals and groups. The ' fact' of social 
53 Dunne, Lonergan and Spirituality, p. 98. 
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conflict highlights important facets or components of community and human history, 
power and authority. As we will discover, these notions are entrenched in the feminist 
debate at hand and, therefore we will briefly examine what Lonergan has to say about 
them. 
Power and authority are not equivalent terms for Lonergan. Power comes from 
the cooperation necessary in the dynamics of community. Lonergan writes: 
As the source of power is cooperation, so the carrier of 
power is the community. By a community is not meant a 
number of people with a frontier. Community means 
people with a common field of experience, with a common 
or at least complementary way of understanding people and 
things, with common judgments and common aims. 
Without a common field of experience people are out of 
touch. Without a common way of understanding, they will 
misunderstand one another; grow suspicious, distrustful , 
hostile, and violent. Without common judgments they will 
live in different worlds, and without common a ims they 
will work at cross purposes. Such, then, is community, and 
as it is community that hands on the discoveries and 
inventions ofthe past and, as well, cooperates in the 
present, so the community is the carrier of power. 54 
However, Lonergan holds that authority is legitimate power. Individuals can 
embody authority, but authority ultimately is derived from the authentic meanings and 
values that inform a community; it is a structured expression of the power controlled by 
the common experiences and common values ofthe community. Those who sanction 
unwarranted actions are the authorities. Their role is to "act in the name of the whole 
community" and they are responsible for organizing and directing "the whole hierarchy 
of cooperating groups in the present .. . distribute the fruits of cooperation among the 
54 See Morelli and Morelli, The Lonergan Reader, p. 551; See Lonergan, A Third Collection, pp. 5-1 2. 
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cooperating members ... [and] ban from social intercourse those who would disrupt 
society."55 This is necessary because when any social order spreads or any community 
grows the need for political structures emerges. The political structures require that the 
individuals who represent or construct the authentic meanings and values of the 
community be key stakeholders in the decision-making process. 
In keeping with 'factual ' history, Lonergan asserts that authority, the authorities, 
and those subject to authorities and power, may be corrupt and just as there is a dialectic 
component to individuals and communities, "There is a dialectic of authority"56 whereby, 
Authenticity makes power legitimate. It confers on power 
the aura and prestige of authority. Unauthenticity leaves 
power naked. It reveals power as mere power. Similarly, 
authenticity legitimates authorities, and unauthenticity 
destroys their authority and reveals them as merely 
powerful. 57 
The dialectic of authority thereby further highlights Lonergan's point that the legitimacy 
of the authority rests in its authenticity. 
Unauthentic subjects get themselves unauthentic 
authorities. Unauthentic authorities favor some groups over 
others .... Community loses its common aims and begins to 
operate at cross-purposes. It loses its common judgments so 
those different groups inhabit different worlds. Common 
understanding is replaced with mutual miscom~rehension. 
The common field of experience is divided .... 
The dialectic of authority is an intricate component ofthe dialectic of history. Power can 
lack authority; legitimate authority can be corrupt. The point to keep in mind is that while 
Lonergan acknowledged the importance of power, he does not reduce his analysis of 
55 See Lonergan, A Third Collection, p. 6. 
56 Morelli and Morelli, The Lonergan Reader, p. 550. 
57 /bid., pp. 7-8. 
58 Ibid., See also Lonergan, A Third Collection, p. 7 
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political and legal structures to the analysis of power. There is legitimate power and 
illegitimate power. Legitimate power derives its authority from the authentic values of a 
community; illegitimate power is simply a matter of force. 
3.3.2.2 Cycles of Decline 
Distortions in the dialectic of community and authority are the results of the flight 
from understanding and they each decrease authenticity in human living to varying 
degrees. Yet, the effect of each is not to be underestimated. Progress is the result of a 
succession of authentic choices based in intelligence and the apprehension of value. 
There are, in turn, optimal situations and the gathering and culmination of higher 
viewpoints. Decline, however, stems from the existence of biases in the process which 
distorts the dialectic of community. A distortion in the dialectic of community will effect 
unintelligible elements in the social situation and produce what Lonergan calls a social 
surd. When this happens, and human living is at the mercy ofthe social surd, society is 
under the rule of non-legitimate power. 
A social surd is residue, it is not something that intelligence anticipates; it is 
imminent in the social situation but it is not intelligible and, from it, we cannot 
intelligently abstract. 59 Because of the unintelligible and residual social surd, it becomes 
more difficult to weed out and reverse inauthentic operations. There occurs cycles of 
decline in which the social situation deteriorates cumulatively60 - a shorter cycle, and a 
59 Shute, OLN DH, pp. 49-51 and Lonergan, Insight, p. 21 . 
60 See Lonergan, Insight, p. 226. 
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longer cycle. Importantly, both are interrelated for their ultimate source is a lack of 
authenticity. 
As a consequence of the cumulative effect of this fourfold 
bias there occurs a regressive cycle of decline. It is initiated 
by a flight from understanding. By virtue of the decreasing 
effectiveness of authenticity in human living it leads in the 
extreme to the corruption of the social situation, the 
complete compromise of authentic scientific investigation, 
and suppression of all further questions relevant to the 
long-range point ofview.61 
The shorter cycle of decline is a consequence of group bias. Group bias leads to 
social injustice and allows the dominant group to exercise power for a time. Yet, it is 
difficult for a group to maintain their position in the face of an expanding social surd and 
the increased demands of marginalized classes. Marginalized groups take up those ideas 
rejected by the dominant groups, conflict ensues and a cycle develops : the dominant 
group loses influence, ability or will to control. The depressed class will rise and, in turn, 
exercise their will to power and implement those rejected ideas. 62 Thus, there is the 
minor principle of group bias, which tends to generate its own corrective. 63 
The longer cycle of decline is the effect of all groups (dominant or marginalized) 
operating with the general bias of common sense. The lack of regard for the long-range 
point of view has consequences on all levels of the human good. The community 
becomes ill prepared to produce a social situation that can meet and compensate new 
ideas. It begins to deteriorate by neglecting relevant questions. Confusion and conflict, 
61 Shute, OLNDH, p. 49. 
62 Ibid. 
63 Lonergan, Insight, p. 235. We will speak to the corrective in the following chapter. The distinction 
between dominant minorities comes from Arnold Tonybee. See A Study of History, vol. l , abridgement of 
volumes I-VI by D.C. Somerville (London: Oxford University Press, 1947 and 1957; reprint, 1988), pp. 
375-403. 
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along with stagnation and hesitancy, emerge. The only discernable intelligibility in the 
objective facts is the equilibrium of economic pressures and a balance of national 
powers. 64 A consequence to this is the diminishing of importance or relevance of 
reflective development, and the detached and disinterested desire to know, whose role it 
is to consider the long-range point of view. 65 
As we have noted, the cultural milieu grounds moral imperatives. lf the reflective 
development or the cultural superstructure is secondary to the infrastructure or is no 
longer at the summit of the choices made by authorities, concrete living necessarily 
becomes unintelligible and inauthentic. Institutions fail to be authentic. Those in the 
community and the people in power become radically uncritical of ideologies that inform 
their existing modes of cooperation, particular goods and value system. Moreover, once 
uncritical, it is increasingly difficult to distinguish decline from progress and progress 
from decline. Thus, though we are essentially free , our own incapacities and biases limit 
the range or perception of the range of our effective freedom, thereby reducing the 
probability of altering the situation.66 
The relationship between the shorter and longer cycles, or the minor and major 
principles of decline, mirrors the relationship between group and general bias. That is, 
clearly the shorter cycle can occur in conjunction with the longer cycle, for general bias 
does not exclude the possibility of group bias. Nevertheless, general bias constitutes the 
major principle of decline while group bias constitutes a minor principle of decline.67 
64 Lonergan, Insight, p. 229. 
65 Shute, OLNDH, p. 50. 
66 Ibid., p. 51; See Lonergan, Insight, p. 235 . 
67 Ibid., p. 52; See Insight, p. 236. 
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Because group bias is minor, it is possible for it to reverse itself in light of new leadership 
and the demise of the dominant minority. 68 Reversing a general bias is difficult, as it 
consists of adopting a higher viewpoint that, because general bias is present, is highly 
unlikely. The moral impotence that is the outcome incomplete intellectual and existential 
development is the ultimate cause. 
When development is incomplete we do not take the time 
to discover necessary practical insights and we are 
unwilling to be persuaded to choose courses of action. The 
result is a gap between the essential freedom we might have 
and the effective freedom we actually do possess. We fail 
to sustain the willingness that would adhere to the 
exigencies of authentic knowing and living. The 
consequence of this is that our knowing, individually and 
collectively, is subject to the cumulative effect of bias.69 
Moral impotence blocks the capacity to attain the requisite higher viewpoints. 
This is not to suggest that many good intentions or moral precepts are missing. Rather, it 
is to say that good intentions and moral precepts do not themselves suffice to counteract 
the lack of the sustained effort of the mind to come up with solutions and the endless 
patience to effect real human collaboration. 
68 Ibid. Shute also notes that it is "Lonergan's view that Marx made the error of failing to distinguish the 
minor and major principle of decline. He grasped that the minor principle would correct itself more quickly 
through class war and concluded from this that a proletariat revo lution would accelerate progress. In fact, 
the class war accelerated the longer cycle and resulted quite quickly in totalitarian rule." See OLNDH, p. 
52. See also Robert Doran, Theology and the Dialectic of History, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
200 I) pp. 387-417 for "a thorough critical analysis of Marx 's dialectical materialism based on Lonergan's 
understanding of the dialectic of history." 
69 Ibid., p. 56. 
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3.4 Summary 
This chapter functioned to expand our account of self-appropriation to include 
more explicitly its social and cultural components within Lonergan's notion of 
community and history, and the dialectics therein. We highlighted Lonergan's notion that 
the capacity for intellectual development, both practical and theoretical , creates the social 
infrastructure of a civilization and, in many ways, practical intelligence per se ensures 
that we develop accordingly and survive. Yet, the reach of human knowing and doing 
goes beyond the merely practical to include culture and value: the aesthetic scientific, 
mystical , and religious. Reflective development allows development to take place on the 
level of meaning and a sustained effort effects progress. Without such effort, a 
community in decline is a messy affair, meaning there is not just one straight line of 
decline. 
We have discerned that Lonergan ' s dialectic of history is not a closed system, 
such as Hegel 's thesis-antithesis-synthesis paradigm. Incorporated are four realms of 
meaning, namely the differentiated realms of consciousness of common sense, theory, 
interiority, and transcendence. The next chapter takes us into an examination of the 
question at the core of the thesis, and applies this chapter, as well as everything 
considered in the first two, to our concern regarding the inherent sexism of the Church, 
and the question of whether it is reversible. 
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Chapter 4: Recasting Gender Bias 
The remote aim of this thesis is to contribute to the task of reconciling feminism 
and Christian faith. The full issue is a large and complex one and whether it can be 
satisfactorily resolved in fact is a matter for the future. The proximate end of this thesis 
is limited in scope, but I hope strategically so. We began with two seemingly 
irreconcilable positions. On the one hand, Hampson argues that one cannot be both a 
feminist and a Christian. One the other hand, Ruether argues that, while Christianity is 
gender biased, this fact is not fatal to Christianity. A full exegesis of this argument would 
lead us into a discussion of basic positions on cognition, epistemology, metaphysics and 
the nature of religion. While we have touched on these issues in our introduction to 
Lonergan' s dialectical philosophy, our aim was to flesh out meaning and reality of bias. 
If we can establish what bias is, then we can consider whether it is a curable disease. If 
bias is by its nature irreversible, then simply establishing the fact of systemic gender bias 
in the Christian religion settles the issue: Hampson's argument is right: the bias saturating 
the Catholic Church is irredeemable and intrinsic to the nature of Christianity. On this 
view, Ruether's effort, though valiant, is hopeless. One cannot more change the nature of 
Christianity than one can turn a tiger into a vegetarian. 
As I made clear from the beginning, I am sympathetic to Ruether's effort to 
reconcile Christian faith and feminism. The issue is both existential and doctrinal. 
Existentially, many women consider themselves both Christians and feminists. Prima 
facia, to be a feminist Christian one must have found a way to reconcile the fact of 
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patriarchy in the Christian churches with the commitment to feminism. Doctrinally , 
Christianity is a religion of redemption. As written in Gal 3: 28, its foundational claim is 
that redemption is available to all : "There is neither Jew nor Greek, slave nor free, male 
nor female, for you are all one in Jesus Christ". Is the gap between the ideal of 'one in 
Christ' and the fact of patriarchy and gender bias in the Christian Church reason enough 
to establish the claim that Christianity is irreconcilably gender-biased? On the surface, 
this appears to be an impossibly high standard. What human being is absolutely 
authentic? What human institution is perfectly attuned to its ideals? Moreover, if it is a 
central claim of Christianity that we are all ' one in Christ', then at least doctrinally, 
Christianity is not by its nature gender biased. However, perhaps we are being too hard 
on Hampson. The spirit of her argument has more to do with the systemic nature of 
patriarchy. For patriarchy is not simply an occasional lapse from ideal practice, it is 
en grained in the tradition and culture. Put this way, the question then shifts. Is a systemic 
bias irredeemable? 
It is here I believe that Lonergan' s analysis of bias is most helpful. For Lonergan, 
the meaning of ' bias ' is understood and conceptualized in terms of a tri-polar dialectic of 
progress, decline and redemption. Lonergan thereby sharply differentiates human nature 
and bias. For Lonergan, sin is not a product of human nature; it is, rather, a failure to 
follow human nature. Progress is a projection of humankind 's ideal nature in history. It 
is intelligent, reasonable and responsible. Bias is unintelligent, unreasonable and 
irresponsible. Can bias be reversed? If we can establish whether there have been any 
instances where human beings changed their mind or shifted the basis on which they 
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acted, we may purport that yes, bias is reversible. Indeed, human history is littered with 
instances of human failure. Yet, there are instances of human success and instances 
where persons, communities, nations and cultures have adopted new ideas, or reversed 
immoral practices. In addition, while there may be many more instances of failure than 
success, we only need to consider one noteworthy instance. For example, it is in fact the 
case that there was once institutional slavery in Great Britain and the United States and 
now there is not. To make the argument we only need one instance. This does not tell us 
how difficult the task is, or even how one might go about doing it. However, the 
difficulty is not the point. As Newman once said: "Ten thousand difficulties do not make 
a doubt." 1 It follows that, if we can reverse systematic bias in one instance, we cannot 
claim that the fact of systematic bias in an institution is per se enough to condemn the 
entire institution. In short, if Lonergan' s account of progress and decline is correct, then 
Hampson's argument does hold up and Ruether's effort to reconcile feminism and 
Christianity is not per se futile. 
How, then, might Lonergan ' s account of the dialectic of history facilitate 
Ruether's efforts? The dialectic of history, in conjunction with his account of the human 
good, provides a general heuristic structure for the analysis of the problem. The structure 
of the good provides a set of invariant terms and relations for social analysis applicable to 
any particular situation. The terms of the dialectic of history set that analysis in the 
dynamic context of history. So far, our discussion has been limited to the first two terms 
of the dialectic: progress and decline. Based on that account we were able to establish the 
1 John Henry Newman, Apologia: Pro Vita Sua, ed. David DeLaura (New York: W.W. Norton, 1968), 
p.239 
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prima facia validity of Ruether' s effort. Both Lonergan's account of bias and Ruether's 
account of patriarchy are open to the possibility of reversal. In fact, both Ruether and 
Lonergan are Christian. Both would claim that the key to the reversal of gender bias and 
the patriarchal culture of Christianity rests at the very core of the Christian faith. For 
Christianity emerged in history as a universal religion of redemption. The Easter event at 
the core of Christian faith is a story about overcoming evil. 
Once again, the purpose is not to produce a theology. Yet, the term redemption is 
here on conceptualized in theological terms to remain in keeping with Hampson's and 
Ruether's 'language', ifyou will. In this chapter, therefore, we will explore the element 
of redemption as understood by Lonergan in his account of the dialectic of history in both 
theological and philosophical terms. This provides the final piece of the analytic structure 
we set out to provide. Once this task is complete, we can turn to some concluding 
remarks. 
4.1 The Third Approximation: Redemption 
What does Lonergan mean by 'redemption'? Redemption is the third 
approximation of the dialectic of history. Lonergan suggests a heuristic structure to the 
solution of the culmination of bias, which is a straight-line of decline. Its purpose is to 
restore authenticity in human living and decision-making. The approximation, according 
to Lonergan, "results from asking how the historical situation that results from both 
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authentic and unauthentic actions can be returned to conformity to a life according to the 
exigencies of progress". 2 
Lonergan initially suggested that the conective be in the form of a philosophy of 
philosophies, one based in critical human science. However, he concluded that, not only 
may the philosophy be too difficult for everyone to grasp intelligently but also human 
subjects develop philosophy and, therefore, permeate the doctrine or method with their 
own moral impotence, bias, and emotionally latent encounters with counter-positional 
differences. Maintaining that the solution to the reign of sin must be universally 
accessible and strong enough to counter the many instances of hatred, or lack of love, 
lack of hope, lack of self-direction and controV Lonergan's solution involves: 
Some reversal of the priority of living over the knowledge 
needed to guide life, and over the good will needed to 
follow knowledge ... [have] a new and lighter integration 
of human activity .. . be transcendent and supernatural ... 
[introducing] new conjugate forms of mans intellect, will 
and sensitivity ... some type of charity, of hope, ofbelief.4 
In this sense, the recovery or corrective agent does not fall outside the invariant structure 
of human consciousness. It is operative in the inherent religious orientation or dimension 
of the human subject and human living and, indeed, human living involves a range of 
capacities. Yet, the most basic, universal, accessible and fundamental capacity is that of 
2 Shute, OLNDH, p. 42. The structure of choice, and choice itself, is the link between human living and the 
dialectical dynamics operative in human history. I have chosen not to deal extensively with choice yet, as I 
see it is most important when linked with free -will, in the context of this thesis. As for its relevance now, 
see Lonergan, Insight, p. 224 and p. 599. See also Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysic of 
Morals, 3d. Ed. , trans. H.J . Paton (New York: Harper and Row, 1964); Giovanni Sala, The A Priori in 
Human Knowledge: Kant 's Critique of Pure Reason and Lonergan, Insight, Thomist 40 ( 1976): pp. 179-
22 1. 
3 See Gerard Walmsley, Lonergan on Philosophical Pluralism: the polymorphism of consciousness as the 
key to philosophy (Toronto: Un ivers ity of Toronto Press, 2008), p. 151 . 
4 Walmsley, Lonergan on Philosophic Pluralism, p. 151. See Lonergan, Insight, pp. 718, 719, and 740. 
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love. Love is not only liberating but instills and sustains a sense of wanting to live 
according to the transcendental precepts: be attentive, intelligent, responsible, and 
reasonable. A life that is rooted in love is rooted in liberation. The third approximation of 
the dialectic of history, in other words, is rooted in love. 
4.1.1 The Gift of Love 
The love that provides a corrective to group bias is not simply the love of one' s 
neighbor. Rather, according to Lonergan, the prescription for the reversal of decline is an 
innate human capacity tofall in love, and to live in a dynamic of God ' s gift of grace. To 
fall in love requires a certain degree of faith. Love is a driver of faith and faith is the 
driver of recovery from bias and decline but it is only the love born out of a relationship 
with God that "is without limits or qualifications or conditions or reservation."5 Based in 
liberation, hope, and charity, this particular type of love orients the subjects to seek 
values, become self-appropriated, to seek out the long-range point of view, to liberate 
oneself or group from the constraints of group bias and restore the integrity destroyed by 
perceived omni-competence of common sense. 
It [religious love] is a state that, once reached, is distinct 
from, prior to, and principle of subsequent judgments of 
value and acts of loving. It is the fulfillment of man's 
capacity for self-transcendence, and as fulfillment, it brings 
deep-set joy and a profound peace. It radiates through the 
whole of one' s living and acting, opening one's horizon to 
the full , purifying one's intentional responses to values, 
rectifying one's scale of preference, underpinning one ' s 
judgments of value, simplifying issues by moving them to a 
5 Lonergan, Method in Theology, p. I 06. 
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deeper level, and strengthening one to achieve the good in 
the face of evil ... . Such being in love is religious. 6 
Religious love thereby is operative through the supernatural acts of grace. For 
instance, the love radiating from intellectual, moral, and affective conversion in their 
broader aspects of authenticity, responsibility, love and faith restores reflective 
development. Love of all kinds restores cultural community. One may argue that to speak 
of love as a way of reversing social conditions and social relations is to assert a utopia. 
However, think of love as one would think of patience. Patience is a choice, one that has 
real concrete implications for social existence and relationships. We share the world with 
people and in so doing we exercise hatred, tolerance or patience. Tolerance is secular. 
Hatred may be rooted in both religious dogma and secularism. Patience is orientated in 
the inherent religious orientation of the human subject. It is to realize that the other 
person has a much right as oneself to be in this world. In the same way, though intensely 
so, religious love is an orientation that informs all actions and decisions in a base of self-
transcendence. 
It is not similar to human intersubjectivity, for that is 
between persons with a common horizon; but this being-
in-love determines the horizon of total self-transcendence 
by grounding the self and its self transcendence in the 
divine lover whose love makes those he loves in love with 
him, and so with one another.7 
This Jove extends itself to form the foundation of faith, hope, and charity and each 
of these have a role in the reversal ofbias. Faith is the knowledge born of religious love, 
6 Lonergan, Philosophical and Theological Papers 1965- 1980, p. 20. 
7 Ibid. , p. 23. 
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it is implicit, unbiased, it is the "eye of otherworldly love, and the love itself is God's 
gift; it is on the level of feelings, values, beliefs, actions, personal encounters, community 
existence, community action and community tradition."8 As such, this knowledge 
contributes to and restores moral development as it places the existential subject in a 
personal relationship with God or 'ultimate concern' that extends beyond the self. Faith 
lessens the tensions and restores integrity because it demands accountability for that the 
desires and equality others. Faith orientates religious people as well as secular groups; it 
is to improve as human beings. In this way, believing in God is different from having 
faith. Lonergan understand belief as: 
... an outer word, as the explicit knowledge handed on by a 
religious tradition. He sees faith as an inner word, as the 
conscious and yet implicit knowledge derived from 
unrestricted loving. Anyone who sincerely loves has 
received from the Holy Spirit this inner word or implicit 
knowledge.9 
In both a secular and religious sense, faith is conceptualized as a particular type of 
knowledge and this knowledge is the vector that moves the human subject to place value 
and the long-sighted point of view above all else, even immediate progress or comfort. 
Belief in an institution is a choice but faith as religious development is an inherent 
operation within every human subject who accepts God's love and ultimate concern. 
Faith concerns mystery, experiencing, and accepting that mystery. Faith is the vehicle by 
which we become orientated toward unrestricted love and allow ourselves to imitate this 
as best we can. 
8 Ibid. , p. 21 . 
9 Louis Roy, O.P. Moral Development and Faith: A Few Lessonsji-om Bernard Lonergan. The Lonergan 
Institute (http://www.lonergan.org/dialogue_partners/roy/Moral_ Development_and_ Faith.htm) 
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4.2 Faith and Human Development: Healing and Creating in History 
The third approximation is rooted in a dynamic of recovery based in the 
cognitional structure and in rational self-consciousness examined in previous chapters. 
First, the four capacities, namely the notions faith, Jove, charity, and hope form a 
heuristic structure and lead into a second movement within the reach of the human 
subject. According to the dialectic of history, bias restricts love and allows moral 
impotence to permeate the individual and collective consciousness. This second 
movement provides a corrective to the hurdles in the first type of development -
development from below upwards - such as moral impotence and restricted Jove. 
Lonergan framed this second type as a movement from "above downwards." 10 
This development begins with, at its base, an ultimate concern born out of self-
transcendence and religious love. Whereas self-transcendence is the criterion for 
authenticity and the first type of development, creativity is the criterion for self-
transcendence and the base of the second type of development. The method by which to 
engage in development from above downwards is to take at the base the transcendental 
precepts. As summarized by Roy: 
So far as the downward movement is concerned, there is a 
dynamic that operates as follows . On the fifth and highest 
level of the human spirit, God grants love and faith. On the 
fourth level, the eye of love discriminates between values 
and disvalues, and greets the judgments of value that are 
offered by an authentic tradition. On the third level, the 
heart invites reason to accept the judgments of fact that the 
Bible presents as words of God and that are passed on by a 
trustworthy Church. On the second and first level, it 
10 Lonergan, A Third Collection, p. 181 . 
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challenges the intellect to appropriate as much as it can the 
meanings transmitted by Christianity. 11 
The religious orientation ofthe individual shifts ones horizon and this shift 
sustains self-appropriation and self-transcendence. The third approximation of 
Lonergan's dialectic of history involves both types of development, and knowledge born 
out of other-worldly love, which is knowledge born out of faith. As Rusembuka notes, 
"the complementary to healing as the intrinsic requirement there is the extrinsic 
requirement of a concomitant creative process," 12 and, quoting Lonergan, "For just as the 
creative process, when unaccompanied by healing, is distorted and corrupted by bias, so 
too the healing process, when unaccompanied by creating, is a soul without a body." 13 
Creativity is at the base of progress and human development in terms of civilization. 
Without the correcting agents inherent to the development from above to below progress, 
the human good is always at the mercy of the social surd. 
Though this movement transcends rational self-consciousness, it is a religious 
pattern of existence dependent on the complementarities of both types of development 
working simultaneously. Just as the already examined development from below to above 
moved the cognitive operations of the human subject and the engagement of subjects 
forward in the method of self-appropriation needed to achieve maturity, so too the 
operations of the human subject will move the individual to reverse bias and restore 
authenticity, though the movement is of a different kind. It involves meta-consciousness. 
11 Roy, O.P. "Moral Development and Faith," p. 2; See Lonergan, Method in Theology, pp. I 15-118. 
12 Muhigirwa F. Brusembuke, The Two Ways of Human Development According to Bernard Lonergan: 
Anticipation in Insight (Gregorian University Press: Roma, 200 I), p. 82. 
13 Muhigirwa, Two Ways of Development, p. 82. See Lonergan , Christology Today: Methodological 
Reflections " in A Third Collection (New York: Paulist Press, 1985), p. I 07. 
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That is, the movement and fluidity between the two types of development engenders a 
horizon to which some refer as operating within a mystic pattern of existence, and in this 
way offers a corrective to the inauthentic response to conditions of human existence. 
Together, these two types of development transpire into meta-consciousness, or a mystic 
pattern of existence that is operative and revealed within Lonergan's transcendental 
method. 
In other words, in mystical consciousness God is present 
not as an object, but as a goal that is both transcendent and 
yet immanent. He (She) is active in the human agent as the 
source, or co-author, of our acts of experiencing (that is, the 
reception of inner and outer data), knowing, and loving. 
The infinite horizon of all knowing and loving somehow 
becomes really "here" in a new form of awareness in what 
mystics call the ground, apex, or center of the soul. 14 
Mystical consciousness in Lonergan 's terms 15 relates to his transcendental method being 
a corrective for intelligently reversing or abstracting the social surd. 16 The mystical 
pattern of existence reinforces the principles of recovery, the restoration of authenticity in 
reflective development, and the correcting agents driving recovery are love, hope, and 
charity. Lonergan writes, 
14 Bernard McGinn, "Mystical Consciousness; A Modest Proposal" in Spiritus: A Journal a/Christian 
Spirituality, vol 8, no I (Spring 2008). Gerard Walmsley also suggests that recovery may be based in the 
mystical pattern of existence. 
15 Lonergan does not focus on mysticism in his dialectical ph ilosophy. See Method in Theology and The 
Philosophy of Cod, and Theology. A lso, see James Robertson Price Ill , The Reintegration ofTheology and 
Mysticism. A Dialectical Analysis of Bernard Lonergan's Theological Method and the Mystical Experience 
ofSymeon the New Theologian (Chicago: University of Chicago Ph.D. Dissertation, 1980) and Price, 
"Lonergan and the Foundation of Contemporary Mystical Theology," Lonergan Workshop 5, ed. Fred 
Lawrence (Chicago: Scholars Press, 1985), pp. 163-95. "Typologies and the Cross-Cu ltural Analysis of 
Mysticism," in Religion and Culture: Essays in Honor of Bernard Lonergan, S.J. , ed. T imothy P. Fallon, 
S.J ., and Philip Boo Riley (A lbany: SUNY Press, 1987), pp. 18 I -90 and "Transcendence and Images: The 
Apophatic and the Kataphatic Revisited," Studies in Formative Spirituality I I ( I 990), pp. I 95-20 I . 
16 See Chapter four of Method in Theology, p. 4 I 0 and Chapter I 7 in Insight, and the "Special Transcendent 
Knowledge" chapter 20 of Insight, referring to the solution to the problem of evil. 
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Since faith gives more truth than understanding 
comprehends; since hope reinforces the detached, 
disinterested and unrestricted desire to know, [humanity's] 
sensitivity needs symbols that unlock its transforming 
dynamism and bring it into harmony with the vast but 
impalpable pressures of desire, of hope and of self-
sacrificing charity. 17 
This development conditions the emergence of the creativity needed for the below-
upward development of experiencing, understanding and judging. These creative 
capacities endorse and inform development above to below, wherein the most important 
element is grace. Grace is universal and permanent. It is in grace that we come into being 
with God, reaching grace by transcending ourselves through love. In addition, this 
means 
18 that, the "historical institutionalization of the church must be continually 
relativized to open up fresh ways to encounter God and incarnate the redemptive 
. " 19 commumty. 
4. 3 Reversal of Patriarchal Culture and Gender Bias 
What would Lonergan say about the reversal of patriarchal culture in 
Christianity? The cognitive and deliberation process behind the constitution of symbols, 
language, literature and other doctrinal foundations of the Church were subject to a web 
of beliefs already embedded in consciousness - leading to Hampson's 'sexist society' . 
The social organization was largely patriarchal and, so, the doctrines reflect this dynamic. 
A group bias operative within the horizon of those creating Christianity, interpreting the 
messages, and developing the doctrines therefore compromised the potential for progress. 
17 Lonergan, Insight, p. 745, as cited in Walmsley, Lonergan on Philosophic Pluralism, p. 153. 
18 Ruether and Hampson, Is There a Place, p. 16. 
19 Ibid. 
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"Patriarchal interests within theology and praxis have rendered women invisible in both 
Church and theology. The exclusion of women from being Church in a visible way is 
identified as sexism."20 The historical accotmts validating reformist efforts in terms of 
emancipating Christianity notwithstanding, the Church and the history of the Church 
maintain a patriarchal 'stance'. Stance, for Lonergan, is bias. Sustaining this stance over a 
course of two centuries involves the notions of authority, power, illegitimate knowledge 
and faulty consciousness. As a result, 
The sexism ofthat society is reflected in a myriad of ways 
in the religion. God is described overwhelmingly using 
male metaphors. Men perform all important roles. The 
parables tell of women carrying our women's tasks, and 
men men's tasks. The early leaders of the Church were 
nearly all male. And so forth. When we do hear of women 
they are usually disadvantaged persons making the best of 
their lot in a male society, and sometimes managing to 
transcend the bounds set for them. The religion cannot be 
freed of this historical context? 1 
Accordingly, the Christ event and the cognitive process behind creating 
Christianity unfolded in a web of both authentic knowledge and genuine personal 
relations that hold legitimate authority and illegitimate authority, revealing legitimate 
power and illegitimate power. The cycle of decline and the dynamic between the groups 
in control involve both a powerful minority and a marginalized group with legitimate 
concerns. This particular dialectic is an instance of the shorter cycle of decline. The 
Catholic Church has a history of engendering biased beliefs and practices, and this bias 
led them to disregard insights emerging from marginalized or oppressed groups, such as 
20 Ibid., p. 27. 
21 Ibid., p. 9. 
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feminist revolutionaries inside and outside of the Church. Based in the tension between 
the routines of present order and the innovations that would alter it, the authority, and the 
authorities themselves, and those subject to authority, revert to a history or a historical 
account of morality that is rooted in sexism. Since the advent of feminism, the Church 
has made some changes; the changes are represented in the dynamic that Lonergan 
describes as the shorter cycle of decline, losing control over marginalized populations; 
feminists having tried to implement rejected ideas - the equality of women and their 
equal role in the Church. The Church has, albeit slowly, accommodated some concerns. 
Nevertheless, the 'revisiting' happened not to the extent needed. 
The pervasive individual rationalizations and collective 
cover stories and ideologies that furnish alibis for the 
ongoing human refusal of rational self-consciousness result 
from moral impotence on the level of originating and 
terminal values.22 
The 'facet' of pervasive individual rationalizations and collective cover stories 
evade neither Hampson nor Ruether in the debate about the Churches sexist history. Both 
feminists also recognize the multiple biases of those who wrote the doctrines. 
Existentially, the collective effort and reflective development of those involved in the 
Church illustrates how a collective contributes to the control of meaning. Yet, the 
collective effort, even if short-sighted or stumped by bias, entangles and weaves a web of 
beliefs that still functions to ground the moral fabric of society, and to ensure 
22 Stephen J. Pope (ed.), The Ethics of Aquinas. (Georgetown University Press, 2002), p. 450. 
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commitment and conversion, for better or worse. Obviously, no society or institution is 
immune to faulty judgments, restrictions, sin and limited horizons. 
The concrete outcome of moral and moral evil is the 
negation ofthe human good: the statistical phenomenon of 
sin and crime on the level of particular goods; structural 
evils in technology, economy, polity, the educational 
system, the arts, in organized religions, and the like, on the 
level of the good of order. The pervasive individual 
rationalizations and collective cover stories and ideologies 
that furnish alibis for the ongoing human refusal of rational 
self-consciousness result from moral impotence on the 
level of originating and terminal values. Concretely, then, 
doing good is usually a matter of overcoming inauthenticity 
and evil within ourselves and in our world.23 
4. 3.1 Christianity, Moral Impotence and Development 
This possibility for overcoming patriarchy is perhaps why Ruether attempts to 
move forward in and with, and not ' beyond' , Christianity. Perhaps Christ was not of this 
world, but the Church fathers are subject to the same 'moral impotence' and incomplete 
development like the rest of the human community. To recall, the development to which 
we refer is what we have already examined in detai l. It is the movement from below to 
above; and it is ordinary; it is common and necessary, albeit creative and conscious, as it 
begins with the data and matures into questions based in ultimate concern. It illustrates 
human creativity and self-development, a process Lonergan describes as : 
[development] from experiencing to growing 
understanding, from growing understanding to balanced 
judgment, from balanced judgment to fruitful courses of 
action, and from fruitful courses of action to new situations 
23 Pope, The Ethics of Aquinas, p. 450. 
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that call forth further understanding, profounder judgment, 
richer courses of action. 24 
This type of development instigates multiple conversions - intellectual conversion is 
becoming self-appropriated, or understanding how it is we understand. Moral conversion 
is choosing what is truly good over mere satisfaction. This lessens or dissolves 
individual, group, and general biases. One does not need to experience institutional 
"religion" to act from a moral standpoint. Yet, in keeping with our discussion about 
openness and love, to have a distinctly religious conversion is to have emerge a 
completely distinct and different "self'. Walter E. Conn notes that, "the criterion of 
human authenticity, of the responsible person, is the self-transcendence that is effected 
through sensitive and creative understanding, critical judgment, responsible decision, 
loyal commitment, and genuine love. "25 This new self operates from a different 
"horizon." The horizon is love and the effect is healing. 
Healing must not be confused with the dominating and 
manipulating to which the reforming materialist is confined 
by his own principles. It has to be kept apart from religious 
hatred and heretical sects and from philosophic hatred of 
social classes.26 
One may suggest that love is involved in the development from below to above; in fact, it 
is integral. Indeed, we can love our families. We love our partners, our children, perhaps 
our nations, perhaps our neighbors. Human love, however, is not without its restrictions. 
24 Lonergan, " Healing and Creating," in Lonergan, A Third Collection. ed. Frederick E. Crowe (New York: 
Paulist Press, 1985). 
25 Walter E Conn . Conscience: Development and Self-Transcendence (Birmingham, AL: Religious 
Education Press, 1981 ), pp. 5-6. 
26 Lonergan, "Healing and Creating," in A Third Collection, p. I 07. 
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Jealousy, irrational thoughts, and biases have a detrimental effect on human love, and 
these place limits on its guarantee for complete development: 
Development is incomplete when it does not go the whole 
way upwards: it accepts some values but its evaluations are 
partial ; or it is not concerned with values at all but only 
with satisfactions or its understanding may be adequate but 
its factual judgments faulty; or finally its understandin~ 
may be more a compromise than a sound contribution. 7 
Moral impotence is therefore the outcome of incomplete intellectual and 
existential development, the development from below upward. Part of living, of course, is 
conforming to the most convincing web of beliefs and discarding others that are not 
emotionally and practically suitable. The Church intended to interpret 'truthfully' and 
raise important insights, and it was a particular group bias, namely gender bias, which led 
them to interpret in a discriminatory way. Is reversing bias an easy task? No. The 
potential that bias will hinder the existential development from below upward to reach 
intellectual and moral maturity is great. Moral impotence and flights from understanding 
or believing that ' knowing is like looking' may be an inescapable part of human 
existence. We may even suggest that multiple encounters with radical moral impotence 
are inevitable?8 
It is impossible to find in oneself the motivation required in 
order to implement fully the five basic precepts: be 
attentive, be intelligent, be rational, be reasonable, be in 
love. Not only are the psyche and the will inadequate to the 
task, but the intellect, having absorbed a lot of false ideas 
during the process of its socialization, easily falls prey to a 
27 
"Natural Right and Historical Mindedness" in Lonergan, A Third Collection, pp. 180- 181 . 
28 See Lonergan, Insight, pp. 619-633 . 
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wrong estimation (or sometimes even denial) of ethical 
. f . d f I . 29 Issues, o sm, an o mora Impotence. 
Though all human subjects are creative beings, the type of human development we are 
speaking of is fragile, and it is subject to flights of understanding and vulnerable to 
buying into biased beliefs. Integrity may easily be lost in a web of decline. However, all 
human begins, especially those sanctioning religious doctrine, create history and create 
the social norms therein. Any sexism inherent within an institution is simply a reflection 
of the biases of the groups and authorities who created that institution. All biases occur 
within the horizon of one' s experience. The aim for reformist feminism is to understand 
that experience correctly. 
4.4 Summary 
The system of patriarchy is rooted in our horizon, one that extends vertically and 
horizontally according to the degrees of our differentiation of consciousness, such as 
when we move from symbolic, common sense undifferentiated consciousness to 
intellectual consciousness involving theory and abstractions. Yet, self-appropriation as a 
method for authenticity is also mode whereby one may shift horizons knowingly, and 
with differing degrees of differentiation. It allows one to understand how others know 
what they know because the structure of knowing is universal. Therefore, it may 
"critically mediate between different modes of knowing, and different horizons of 
29 Louis Roy, O.P., Moral Development and Faith: A Few Suggestions from Bernard Lonergan, 
www.lonergan.org/dialogue partners/roy/Moral Development and Faith.htm 
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meaning".30 Just as when that fine line separating the below from the sky, our horizon 
and therefore the meanings to which we attach ourselves change according to, "the scope 
of our knowledge, the range of our interests."31 That is, Lonergan agrees that, though all 
knowledge may be prejudiced, this does not mean that there are no correct, or legitimate, 
answers. That is, one may correct one's biases, and multiple encounters with insights and 
recovery is an inevitable part of existence as well. One may come to reveal in the 
questions themselves both the legitimate and illegitimate presuppositions. In short, 
patriarchy is reversible. 
30 Whamsley, Lonergan on Philosophic Pluralism, p. 30 
3 1 Lonergan, Method in Theology, p. 263. See also Whamsley, Lonergan on Philosophic Pluralism. 
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Epilogue 
Many feminist analyses of patriarchy, secular and otherwise, provide a concrete 
instance of the workings of Lonergan's notion of bias in thought, society, and culture.' 
The historico-religious triad of progress, decline and redemption provides us with a 
framework and philosophy that are compatible with the particular aims of feminism, 
namely recovery from gender bias. Indeed, uncovering and overcoming the errors that 
have become part of our web of belief is a difficult task. Yet, it is not impossible. It is 
within this particular shade of grey that we may take Hampson to task. As Lonergan 
suggests, moral impotence and the limitations on effective freedom are not the whole 
story.2 In short, "because God exists there is a further intelligibility to be grasped."3 
Lonergan' s social philosophy provides a corrective to moral impotence and the reality of 
decline, and this corrective rests in the third approximation of the'dialectic of history: 
redemption. 
The central goal of this thesis was to contribute to the task of reconciling 
feminism and Christian faith, and we find such reconciliation within the depth of what 
Lonergan means by redemption. Another proximate end of the thesis was to bolster 
Ruether's position by using our framework as laid out in the thesis. This is the main task 
ofthe epilogue. We conclude with a reflection on the implications of Lonergan 's 
philosophy for patriarchy in general. 
1 See Kidder, "Woman of Reason." 
2 Lonergan, Insight, p. 730. 
3 Ibid. 
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Concluding Remarks: Recasting the Feminist Debate 
First, we ask, is Hampson using a hermeneutic of bias? That is, is she operating, 
cognitively, from the same flight of understanding of which the Church itself is guilty? 
Perhaps the viewpoint of radical feminism is as exclusionary to the opposite sex as the 
' historical society ' to which Hampson refers as honify ing. Perhaps the edge of 
Hampson 's sword is her own bias, and her own bias is cousin to the bias that perpetuates 
post-Christian philosophy. That is, it is reasonable to put forward that advocating for a 
woman-centered religion or spirituality is akin to group bias, and is therefore the same as 
the Church operating stubbornly from a male-centered religion. Can we suggest that 
Hampson, and indeed the post-Christian enterprise, are operating from a sex ism 
resembling the sexism that is " supposedly inherent" to traditional male-dominated 
religious institutions? These questions demand that Hampson herself be present to 
answer. For now, however, we can counter her argument as laid out in the article, 
regard less of the possibility of bias, and maintain that she ironically reinforces the main 
tenets of Lonergan 's social philosophy as well as its heuristic structure. In other words, 
using the phi losophy laid out in the thesis, we can discredit Hampson's logic and, in turn, 
bolster Ruether' s position. 
First, Hampson believes that there is no inconsistency or tension inherent to the 
relationship between feminism and religion; feminism is in some way or in some sense a 
religious matrix; femini sm is all the way a religious matrix as far as it is a struggle for 
liberation. Yet, at the same time, Hampson remarks: " religion is potent. It has been the 
most potent ideology the world has known for undermining the integrity of women as 
11 1 
1 
first-class members ofhumanity."4 Hampson is seemingly conflating the Church and 
Christian faith, faith and religion, or religion and the Church, or perhaps all of the above. 
If feminism is in some was a religious matrix, is it potent as well? Lonergan clarifies that 
feminism and faith are more than compatible; they are integral to meeting each other 
ends, especially in terms of liberation. In light of Lonergan's philosophy, moreover, 
Hampson's claim that Christianity is not empowering because there is the expectation 
that one deny the 'self is clearly off the mark. To recall, she writes: 
It [Christianity] seems a very male way of thinking of God 
[which is a biased judgment against men]: God is one who 
is objective to us, over-against us, and separate from us. It 
comports much better with my feminist sense of reality and 
my feminist ethic to conceive of God as being within us, 
moving between us and indeed .. . coming into being with 
us.
5 
Lonergan's transcendental philosophy, as it is based in systematic theology, roots 
God and the principles of faith-based knowledge as ' inherent to ' the human subject and 
therefore at the core of empowerment and self-growth. Lonergan's philosophy, that is, 
not only accounts for all of Hampson ' s claims, but also serves to rebuke them. First, God 
is not objective to us. Rather, we achieve objectivity through self-appropriation, which 
leads to a relationship with God. We develop from below to above or above to below, and 
counter injustice by accepting and maintaining both types as operative in us. The inherent 
religious aspect of our living lets us enter into a relationship with mystery, with God, 
with ultimate concern, a relationship motivated by the ever-expanding will to love, which 
defends and protects us against the ever-present will to power. The crux of the dynamic 
4 Ruether and Hampson, Is There a Place? p. 13. 
5 Ibid. , p. 12. 
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that hinders Hampson's point is that, neither God, nor the imperative of faith, nor the 
types of development, which unfold and expand over the life-course, are working over-
against us. Nor are they separate from us. Rather, Lonergan posits grace as supernatural; 
God is supernatural but also integral to our 'selves' when appropriated and authentic. It is 
through knowing oneself, and knowing how we understand what it is we understand that 
we reach God or a transcendental self, able to reform that which works to oppress or 
marginalize. In contrast to Hampson's idea of Christianity, therefore, where sexism is 
irrevocable, we erect the method of self-appropriation to allow real movement toward 
overcoming bias (the mainstay of all feminism). Lonergan places the power within the 
human subject (the power being rooted in a relationship with God, not over-against), and 
thereby reveals the 'self as a genuine vehicle for liberation. 
Without consideration ofLonergan's philosophy, radical feminism may (if it has 
not already) emerge as an ideology that may serve to discount other groups. Indeed, 
Lonergan's notion of the shorter cycle of decline emphasizes Ruether's point: 
... That liberation includes liberation from patriarchy; 
liberation means the creation of a new society and culture 
where women are fully valued, but not the creation of a 
new oppression of other groups whose value is discounted 
and unnoticed. There were also many women, and 
movements of women, that tried to do this in the past. 
Christianity therefore, (actually, it may be any religion but, importantly, Christianity is 
one of them) provides the very antidote for that which Hampson claims Christianity does 
not possess or, in the least, actively denies women, namely freedom. Hampson appears to 
find it extraordinary that she, since discarding the institution, has " learned to love God 
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myself. .. . I think of God as the basis of all that is; that with which, when we are in tune, 
we can come to be healed and be most fully ourselves."6 Yet, as we have considered 
throughout this thesis, Lonergan's posits the self as 'most full' when she is with God or 
living according to transcendental precepts. His framework illustrates that the human 
subject is most fully ' developed' when living in grace with God, upon falling in love, and 
using the principles of faith-based knowledge or meta-consciousness to enhance 
understanding and forgiveness. These notions are paradoxically in keeping with 
Hampson's idea of God and spirituality. Hampson reveals that, though she divorced 
herself from the institution, " ... Prayer and a love of God, which were simply too deep in 
me, held .... A more specifically religious understanding of life fits well with this." In the 
end, if one projects Lonergan ' s notion of faith , especially the tenor of mysticism in the 
third approximation of recovery, we reveal the mode of spirituality that Hampson calls 
for. Not only does Lonergan ' s philosophy highlight a spiritual operation in the individual 
but also it adds a dynamic of faith that "has to do with a stillness, a centeredness in God, 
and indeed a ' focus' on God." 7 Lonergan provides, that is, a "revolution in how we 
perceive God," a revolution that Hampson herself demands. Strangely enough, Lonergan 
achieves this feminist aim in terms ofthe Christian faith. 
To this end, I claim that there is no contradiction between Christianity and 
feminism. In fact, there is undeniable compatibility. As Ruether points out, "faith 
statements are basically statements about one's fundamental values and stance toward 
6 Ibid. , p . 11. 
7 Ibid., p. 22. 
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life."8 Lonergan addresses the feminist agenda and feminist principles within his broader 
paradigms of cognitional theory and the dialectic of history: "that which is exterior to 
ourselves cannot be allowed to have authority over us"9 since self-appropriation allows 
nothing to have authority over the human subject except legitimate authority, which is in 
harmony with feminist principles. Feminists, through an exegesis of a theological social 
philosophy, hereby have a distinct ability to be their own authority. We do not obey God 
rather than our own best will. Rather, it is in the actualization of the integrity within our 
best free will achieved through faith and self-appropriation that we obey God. Our best 
will becomes full, or is ever becoming, when we enter into this mutual beneficial 
relationship with God or ultimate concern and mystery. In short, Lonergan provides a 
notion of faith that allows for a God that is in keeping with Hampson's desire: "For [a] 
God that with which I am in tune, not one separate from myself who commands." 10 
Whereas Hampson conflates the history of Christianity and the history of the 
Church, the dialectic of history strengthens Ruether's position. "God is experienced in the 
midst of human action in conflicts over social justice and injustice. God is experienced as 
' breaking into' existing social reality as judgment upon human claims to 
righteousness." 11 Lonergan's social philosophy, moreover, can further validate Ruether's 
argument that ideological and dominant systems of power are shattered because of fa ith. 
To ' break into ' does not suggest that God is exercising power over-against us. Rather, 
8 Ibid. , p. 24 
9 Ibid., p. 12 
10 Ibid., p. 12 
II Ibid. , p. 16 
115 
It means one is transported into a compelling experience of 
authentic divine justice in a way that reveals the utter 
hollowness of the claims to divine righteousness made by 
such systems of domination. One is also grounded anew in 
God 's true mandate for creation that empowers one to 
struggle against demonic misuse of power. This type of 
religious experience is very appropriate for one moment of 
feminism. 12 
Engendering a framework that may reconceptualize the notion of gender bias is 
difficult. Gender inequality is not simply a self-serving fiction, but a system of 
oppression with real world implications. As Paulette Kidder notes, "Because of bias, 
individuals, groups, and whole cultures can build up self-serving fictions in place of 
potentially harmful realities or in place of realities that demand se1f-transformation."13 
Self-transformation also demands that feminists revisit their own biases in their working 
knowledge. Indeed, using Lonergan's philosophy to assert a reflexive analysis, the 
interpretation of Lonergan and feminism in this thesis does not subsist outside of my own 
biases. We as feminists must confront our own neurosis in the process of any 
deconstruction or analysis. In addition, all interpretations are subject to the same critique. 
Yet, it is with this understanding that we move forward. I move forward by laying the 
foundation upon which this thesis stood in an interest in discovering, or unpacking, the 
"macro why" behind the question of "how" this self-serving fiction is undermining the 
authority of Christianity, authority from which many feminists are trying to break free. 
Feminist theologians generally examine the origins of the androcentric bias 
grounding Christian tradition. Some suggest it was in the creation accounts in the first 
12 Ibid., p. 16. 
13 Kidder, "Woman of Reason," p. 43. 
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book of the Hebrew Scriptures: creating women first posits women as secondary human 
subjects. It creates a c lass system. 14 Obviously, these suggestions perpetuate a bias based 
in what was thought to be reasonable, and puts into motion various set of dualisms and 
identifiers which continue to be passed down from generation to generation: mind and 
body, rational and emotional, good and bad, divine and human whereby male is 
associated with the former. 15 Indeed, the aim of feminist theology " is not a gender neutral 
theology, but one that is aware of the existence of such gender bias and points out the 
contingency of gender constructions. The inherent gender bias is named patriarchy." 16 
We surmised and agreed that Christianity is deeply problematic. At the core of the post-
Christian agenda is the effort to illustrate the fact that, intrinsic to the nature of 
Christianity is a sexism that disallows equality. Hampson writes, "Christianity is a 
historical religion. It is by nature a historical religion; and it is this which makes it so 
impossible for women." 17 
It is my sincere hope that this thesis provided an alternative perspective. It is 
because Christianity is a historical religion that the possibility of a woman being both 
feminist and a Christian is ripe. Bias is reversible and is espec ially so using Lonergan's 
dialectical philosophy as a foundation for recasting Christian principles of faith. In 
making this journey, we may render Hampson's conclusion and worldview unreasonable. 
After laying down Lonergan 's philosophy and anchoring the framework in a method, one 
that celebrates the human subject and, indeed, the human spirit, Hampson 's logic is no 
14 Natalie K. Watson, Feminist Theology (Cambridge: Wm B. Eerdmans Publishing, 2003), p. 26. 
15 See Genevieve Lloyd, The Man of Reason: 'Male' & 'Female' in Western Philosophy (London: 
Routledge, 1993). 
16 Watson, Feminist Theology, p. 26. 
17 Ruether and Hampson, Is There a Place? p. 8. 
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longer seamless: "For a feminist to be Christian and also to be true to herself and to her 
feminist beliefs is, I am suggesting, not possible." 18 She continues, 
I think we must have some minimal definition of . .. the 
equality of women and men with all that that implies. I am 
contending that a religion based on this past, patriarchal 
history and these patriarchal symbols ... cannot actually 
promote equality as long as it is based on this history and 
retain the symbols for God which arise out of this context. 19 
Feminism runs parallel to Lonergan's underlying emphasis on freedom, self-
development, creativity and health in both self-appropriation and the relationship with 
God. Meaning-systems change and shift, and that which is at the crux of these changes is 
love. Through encouraging transcendence and differentiation of consciousness, symbol 
systems can have new meaning. The question of compatibility between feminism and 
faith, or feminism and religion, is rooted in the fragmentation and conflicts on the level of 
culture and symbol systems. Indeed, Christianity is a dialectically opposing force to the 
shift in the control of meaning, one that is the catalyst behind the feminist movement. 
Yet, as Crysdale notes, feminism is not about changes in what we know, but the changes 
in how we know, how we understand what we understand. "Feminism is a challenge to 
the way we have gone about knowing. The epistemological terra firma of the recent past 
is rocking and as the event develops, it promises to change the face of the earth. "20 
Therefore, 
A successful response to the contemporary crisis of culture 
must involve a recovery of the truth of transcendence -
18 Angela Pears, Feminist Christina Encounters: The Methods and Strateg ies of Feminist Informed 
Christina Theologies ( Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing, 2004) p. 63 . 
19 Ibid. 
2° Crysdale, Lonergan and Feminism, p. 4. 
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both a philosophical recovery ... and a renewal of 
spontaneously felt and acknowledged participation in 
transcendent meaning at the level of everyday living. A 
recovery of transcendence is essential to moving beyond 
the alienations and confusions of our epoch because, as 
Lonergan puts it, human beings are by nature oriented into 
transcendent mystery, and therefore human existence that is 
balanced, integrated, and joyful will always require 
convincing symbolic articulations of the human drama that 
incorporates the fact of transcendent meaning. 21 
I end with a contribution to the dialogue confined to the bounded covers of New 
Blac/ifriars. I ask, is there a place for feminism in the Catholic Church? Within the ebb 
and flow of progress, decline and redemption, Daphne, I think that you can finally 
rejoice: you have found your spirituality in the one you had discarded. In addition, 
Rosemary, you can go out full throttle armed with a solid scheme for your philosophy of 
reform. Lonergan' s social philosophy and, in particular, his notions of knowing and 
redemption, implies freedom and faith are intrinsic to all individuals. In simply being 
human, all "feminist women [are] free to speak religiously in a way which is in 
conformity with their sense of reality and ofthemselves."22 Lonergan' s cognitional 
method, and that of deliberation, shows that being human is in some, if not all ways, a 
religious matrix. His dialectical philosophy illustrates how knowledge born of faith is a 
cousin to the already inherent moral quest and religious operations of the human subject. 
History is the product of the dialectical creativity, healing and moral journey of each 
individual writ large in community. Decline is the product of the lack thereof. Indeed, to 
overcome social injustice and seek equality, we can draw on our all-access pass to 
2 1 Glenn Hughes, Transcendence and History: The Search for Ultimacy from Ancient Societies to Post-
modernity (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2003) p. 362. 
22 Radford Ruether and Hampson, Is There a Place? p. 13. 
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'mystical consciousness' and faith while we are inter-related with it, living a life in self-
appropriated awareness, and falling gracefully in love with God or mystery and ultimate 
concern -all those things confined within the deep recesses of history and the human 
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